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# Individual-Level Determinants of Corruption Perception in Five Areas of Public Life in Sweden

Evidence from 2022 SOM Survey

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Working paper series 2024:11

Hampus Hallin  
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**QoG** THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE

Department of Political Science  
University of Gothenburg  
Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG  
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# Individual-Level Determinants of Corruption Perception in Five Areas of Public Life in Sweden: Evidence from 2022 SOM Survey

Hampus Hallin

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## **Abstract**

Corruption perceptions are not only shared social norms shaped by societal dynamics, but they also reflections of individual experiences, values, and viewpoints. This study examines the relationship between a set of individual- and community-level factors and perceptions of corruption, using the data from a nationwide survey in Sweden. We analyze the drivers of corruption perceptions among Swedish citizens across five key areas of public life: politicians, civil servants, police, public healthcare, and foreign aid. Our findings reveals that Swedish citizens hold sector specific perceptions of corruption – rather than singular and unified – with the foreign aid perceived as the most corrupt sector and healthcare as the least corrupt. Only a few factors exhibit a statistically significant impact on corruption perception across all five areas, reinforcing our main finding that there are varieties of corruption perceptions rather than a singular, unified view of corruption in the public sector.

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# Introduction

The extensive body of literature links corruption not only to trust in political institutions and government policies, but also to generalized interpersonal trust ((Rothstein, 2011b; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008)).<sup>1</sup> While actual instances of corruption undoubtedly play a role, the mere belief that corruption is pervasive can be equally, if not more, damaging (Melgar et al., 2010). Perceptions of corruption can erode public confidence, breed cynicism, and undermine the social fabric, leading to a vicious cycle where trust diminishes, and governance becomes even more challenging.

If interpersonal trust is, as (Uslaner, 2002, p.1) aptly describes, 'the chicken soup of life' – the element that improves everything – then corruption must be seen as the sticky, burnt residue at the bottom of the skillet, making everything worse. Even if, as an aspiring chef, you are unsure of the discoloration's nature and the potential danger it poses to your culinary creation, a lingering sense of unease can still arise from even a seemingly harmless taint,<sup>2</sup> Such is the case with perceptions of corruption. When individuals perceive corruption, it generates a sense of unease that transcends personal experience, gradually eroding trust in both political institutions and fellow citizens (referred to hereafter as generalized or social trust).

Given the profound impact that perceptions of corruption can have on trust in institutions and fellow citizens, it is crucial to understand the factors that shape these perceptions. This study focuses on a range of individual factors identified in previous literature and examines their association with corruption perceptions using the SOM Institute's 2022 survey of Swedish citizens. We analyze the drivers of corruption perceptions among Swedish citizens across five key areas of public life: politicians, non-elected central government employees (*offentliga tjänstemän*), police, public healthcare, and foreign aid.

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<sup>1</sup>A recent review suggests that "The causation seems to run both ways – from trust to corruption as well as from corruption to trust. (You et al., 2018, p.492). However, as the literature lacks empirical evidence meeting current standards of causal identification, we set aside the issue of reverse causality in our paper, focusing instead on the classical association between corruption and trust.

<sup>2</sup>For example, the combination of heat and chromium in stainless steel can create a harmless but unsettling rainbow-like film on your skillet. Tip: use vinegar to remove it.

# 1 Data and Method

The data is drawn from the annual surveys conducted by the SOM Institute at the University of Gothenburg (SOM, 2022). These surveys, initiated in 1986, have become a cornerstone of Swedish opinion research, being widely utilized by academics, policy makers and the media. The SOM surveys are administered through postal questionnaires (in Swedish) sent to a large randomly selected group of individuals aged 16 to 90 residing throughout Sweden, drawn from the Swedish Tax Agency register.<sup>3</sup> This includes both Swedish and foreign citizens. The 2022 survey comprised of seven parallel surveys, each sampling 3,750 respondents. One of these surveys – SVERIGE III – featured questions about perception of corruption.

We employ this data using a standard Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) model. We do a stepwise introduction of a standard set of individual characteristic explanatory factors, informed by the literature, in five separate analysis for each area of concern.

## 1.1 Corruption as a Public Concern

First, respondents were asked to indicate their level of concern regarding various aspects of public life (see appendix for the full list of questions D). As Figure 1 shows, among these issues, corruption was ranked as the fifth least concerning issue, perceived as only slightly more worrisome than working conditions, lack of housing, unemployment and digital surveillance. Russia's invasion of Ukraine emerged as the most pressing concern, followed by organized crime (ranked 2nd), narcotics (4th), and political extremism (8th). Notably, while Swedes expressed worry about the war in Ukraine and also military conflicts in general (7th), they were less concerned about the prospect of a new world war, which ranked one position just above corruption. There was also a high level of concern for environmental deterioration in general, and in particular, the deterioration of marine environments (5th and 3rd respectively), as well


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<sup>3</sup>Since 2012, respondents can also complete the SOM surveys online by using personal login credentials provided in the mailed materials.

as climate change (6th). Inflation was another major concern (9th), unsurprising given that the survey was conducted during a period of rising inflation (Radio Sweden, 2022).

The data suggests that corruption, though a concern, was not among the most pressing issues for the average Swede, ranking as the fifth least concerning item included in the survey. This is not surprising given that Sweden had been one of the least corrupt countries globally, ranking joint 5th on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2022 (Transparency International, 2022). We take this into consideration when interpreting the results of our analyses.

Figure 1: Corruption as a Public Concern



Note: The survey question asked: “If you look at the situation today, how worrying do you personally find the following for the future?” Respondents could choose from the following options: 1 = not at all concerned to 4 = very concerned.


## 1.2 Outcomes of Interest

Respondents were also asked to indicate their perceptions of corruption with regard to the following groups: politicians, non-elected central government employees (hereafter civil service),

healthcare workers, police, and the foreign aid sector.

As Figure 2 indicates, among these issues, perception of corruption was highest in the foreign aid sector, followed by politicians, civil servants and police. Swedish citizens perceived corruption to be least spread among healthcare workers.

Figure 2: Corruption Perception in Five Areas of Public Life




Note: The survey question asked: “According to your assessment, to what extent are the following occupational groups and sectors involved in some sort of corruption?” Respondents could choose from the following options: 1 = not at all concerned to 7 = to a large extent.

Given that the foreign aid sector is perceived as being particularly affected by corruption, it is noteworthy that the phrasing of the survey question – “In your opinion, to what extent is aid to developing countries involved in corruption?” – may have influenced responses by capturing not only perceptions of corruption within Swedish organizations involved in international development assistance, but also respondents’ perceptions on the broader contexts in which these organizations operate. This suggests that that perceptions of corruption in foreign aid sector may be heightened by assumptions that aid recipients in corruption-prone contexts might misuse the funds.

An analysis of the correlations of corruption perceptions across the five areas shows considerable variation, ranging from .2 (between public healthcare and foreign aid) to .75 (between politicians and civil servants). As shown in Figure 3, most correlations are either weak – such as those between healthcare and politicians, healthcare and civil servants, and police and foreign aid – or moderate, including those between politicians and police, politicians and foreign aid, civil servants and foreign aid, civil servants and police, and healthcare and police.

These results indicate that citizens do not have a uniform view of corruption across all sectors;

Figure 3: Correlations between Areas of Corruption Perception



Note: Person's (r) coefficients are reported.

instead, they hold distinct perceptions regarding the extent of corruption in different public domains. This finding raises an important question about the validity of general corruption perception indicators that do not specify particular areas of public life. If citizens perceive corruption differently across sectors, then survey measures that capture an overall perception of corruption in the public sector may obscure meaningful distinctions. Such generalized indicators may, in fact, mask sector-specific concerns and dynamics, potentially leading to an incomplete understanding of public attitudes toward corruption. The variation observed in this data suggests a need for more nuanced measures that differentiate between sectors, thereby offering a more accurate representation of public concerns about corruption across different areas of public life.

### 1.3 Explanatory Factors

We examine the impact of a set of socio-demographic, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of individuals on their perception of corruption in each of the five areas. The **socio-demographic characteristics** include: age, gender, level of education, family status, occupation, income (individual income in the main analysis and household income in the robustness checks). **Attitudinal characteristics** include: satisfaction with democracy, trust in (central) government and its departments, generalized trust, and a self-declared position on left-right scale. **Behavioral characteristics** include: a variable measuring individual level of political participation and the party the respondents voted for in the last parliamentary elections. Table

A2 of Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables and their measurements. Table B1 of Appendix A presents the descriptive statistics.

In addition we control for municipality fixed effects to control for the municipality-level contextual factors. Each analysis is based on responses from around 1,000 respondents (see Table 1).

Table 1: Number of Observations in the Final Model of Each Analysis

<b>Final Model</b>	<b>N</b>
Civil Servants	1026
Politicians	1041
Police	1051
Healthcare Workers	1049
Foreign Aid Sector	951

## 2 Empirical Analysis

### 2.1 Politicians

Figure 4 visualizes the statistically significant coefficients of the fully-specified model (Model 10 in Table B1, Appendix B) of the analysis on the determinants of corruption perception among politicians. Of three types of individual-levels characteristics, it is the attitudinal factors that appear to matter most for peoples perception of corruption among politicians. Specifically, higher trust in government agencies, higher satisfaction with democracy (both statistically significant at the 99.9% level) and higher generalized trust (99%) are associated with lower perception of corruption, controlling for all other factors considered.

The quantitative effect of these variables is substantial: a change from the lowest to the highest level of trust in government agencies corresponds to the reduction in perception of corruption by around 46 percentage points. The increase in the satisfaction with democracy and in trust on fellow citizens from the lowest to the highest levels correspond to the reduction in the

perceptions of corruption among politicians by 21 and 13 percentage points correspondingly.

Of the socio-economist characteristics of the respondents it is only occupation that matters for corruption perception. Specifically, self-employed individuals, including farmers, are more likely to perceive corruption as high compared to employees without managerial responsibilities.

It is noteworthy that respondents' involvement in political activity does not have a statistically significant effect on their perception of corruption among politicians. The political party respondents voted for in the most recent parliamentary election generally does not have a significant impact on their perceptions either, with one exception: respondents who voted for the Christian Democrats (KD: Kristdemokraterna) perceive higher levels of corruption within the political class compared to those who voted for the Social Democrats.

Figure 4: Corruption Perception Among Politicians: Statistically Significant Predictors



The effects of local socio-economic and political context, as proxied by municipal fixed effects, account for approximately one-fifth of the variation in the dependent variable. The full model, which includes all predictors, explains about 44% of the variance.

The full models are presented in Table B1 of Appendix B. As it can be seen, most variables are not statistically significant throughout the analysis. However, education is statistically significant and negatively signed – indicating that individuals with higher levels of education perceive less corruption – in models that include only socio-economic predictors. This effect, however, falls below the accepted threshold once municipal fixed effects are accounted for. Respondent income is statistically significant and negatively signed – indicating that higher earners perceive less corruption – in Models 4-6, but not in the rest of the models. Variables capturing political behavior exert no statistically significant effect. Figure B1 of Appendix B presents all coefficients that are statistically not significant.

## 2.2 Civil Servants

This analysis differs from the others in that it excludes the variable measuring trust in government agencies. The rationale behind this exclusion is that both trust in government agencies and perceptions of corruption in the civil service fundamentally reflect the same underlying attitude toward public administration.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 5 presents the statistically significant coefficients from the fully-specified model (Model 10 in Table B2, Appendix A). Similar to the analysis regarding politicians, satisfaction with democracy and trust in fellow citizens emerge as statistically significant predictors (at the 99.9% confidence level) of corruption perceptions in the public administration. A change from the lowest to the highest level of satisfaction with democracy is associated with a 27 percentage point decrease in perceived corruption, while a similar shift in trust in fellow citizens corresponds to a nearly 24 percentage point reduction in the outcome variable. These attitudes exhibit a slightly greater quantitative impact on perceptions of corruption in public administration compared to those concerning politicians. This finding further substantiates the well-established association between trust in government and generalized trust (Rothstein &

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<sup>4</sup>As the association between the two variables is not prohibitive for the inclusion of the variable trust in government agencies into the analysis ( $r = -.46$ ), in the robustness checks we re-run the analysis with the inclusion of the trust in government agencies variable to find the results to be substantively the same as in the main analysis.

Stolle, 2008).

Figure 5: Corruption Perception Among Civil Servants: Statistically Significant Predictors



Among socio-economic variables, occupation is a statistically significant predictor of the perception of corruption in the civil service. Compared to the reference group (employees without managerial responsibilities), being self-employed is associated with a heightened perception of corruption in public administration, while being an employee with managerial responsibilities is not statistically significant. Furthermore, education is statistically significant and negatively signed, indicating that more educated respondents perceive Swedish bureaucrats as less corrupt compared to those with lower levels of education. A change in education level from the least to most educated is associated with a reduction in corruption perception by about 12 percentage points.

In terms of political behavior, neither the level of political activity nor voting for a particular political party in most the recent parliamentary election has a statistically significant effect on perceptions of corruption in public administration.

The influence of local socio-economic and political contexts, proxied by municipality fixed

effects, accounts for approximately one-quarter of the variance in the dependent variable. The final model, which incorporates all predictors, explains 39% of the variance in perceptions of corruption within the civil service.

## **2.3 Public Health**


Figure 6 displays the statistically significant coefficients from the fully-specified model analyzing corruption among healthcare workers. Of the three types of individual characteristics, only two – gender and generalized trust – are statistically significant (both at the 99 % level) in the final model (Model 10 in Table B3, Appendix B). Specifically, being a male and having high levels of generalized trust are both associated with lower levels of perception of corruption among healthcare workers.

Examining the quantitative effects of these variables, we find that they are quite modest: being male, compared to female, is associated with a 3 percentage points lower corruption perception, whereas moving from being the least trusting to most trusting corresponds to a reduction in corruption perception by 15 percentage points.

Examining the effects of the party voted for in the most recent election (Table C5), we found that respondents who returned their ballot papers void perceive, on average, about 20 percentage points more corruption than voters who cast their ballots for SD, M, V, C, or KD. In other words, respondents who can be assumed to be signal their dissatisfaction with the political status quo perceive higher levels of corruption in this sector than the average Swedish voter. Among the five areas of public life examined, public health is the only one where casting a blank ballot paper exerts a statistically significant effect on corruption perception.

The influence of local socio-economic and political contexts, as proxied by municipality fixed effects, accounts for about one-quarter of the variance in the dependent variable. The final model, incorporating all variables, accounts for 36% of the variance in perceptions of healthcare workers corruption, which is slightly lower than the explained variance in perceptions of

Figure 6: Corruption Perception among Healthcare Workers: Statistically Significant Predictors




politicians and civil servants corruption.

## 2.4 Police

Figure 7 reports the statistically significant coefficients from the fully specified model (Model 10 in Table B4, Appendix A). Among the three types of characteristics, the attitudinal factors once again exert the strongest influence on perceptions of police corruption. Both trust in government agencies and generalized trust are statistically significant at the 99.9 % level, and each is negatively signed. Additionally, the coefficient for respondent age is statistically significant (at the 99%) level and negatively signed, indicating that older respondents tend to perceive less corruption in the police. Among all areas of public life examined, police corruption is the only one where respondent age emerges as a statistically significant factor.

The coefficient for gender is negatively signed throughout the models and remains statistically significant in all but the final model, where the respondent's positioning on the left-right polit-

Figure 7: Corruption Perception Among Police Personnel: Statistically Significant Predictors



ical scale is included.

An examination of the quantitative effects reveals that trust in government agencies has the largest impact on reducing perceptions of corruption. Moving from the lowest to the highest level of trust is associated with a 33 percentage-point decrease in perceived police corruption. In contrast, equivalent shifts in other variables yield only a 15-percentage-point reduction in corruption perception.

The effects of the party voted for in the most recent parliamentary election (Table C4) are largely not statistically significant.

The local socio-economic and political contexts, as measured by municipal fixed effects, explain a one-fifth of the variance in the dependent variable. The final model, incorporating all predictors, accounts for 35% of the variance in corruption perception, which is consistent with the explanatory power observed in the analysis for public health workers.

## 2.5 Foreign Aid


Figure 8 presents the statistically significant coefficients of the fully-specified model for corruption perception of the foreign aid sector (Model 10 in Table B5, Appendix B). Once again, it is the attitudinal variables that appear to matter most for respondents' perceptions of corruption in the foreign aid sector. Specifically, both trust in government agencies and trust in fellow citizens are statistically significant and negatively signed, indicating that the more respondents trust the government and in others, the weaker their perceptions of corruption. Furthermore, respondents' self identification on the left-right political scale is statistically significant and positively signed, suggesting that more right-leaning respondents are more likely to perceive the foreign aid sector as corrupt. Interestingly, among all areas of public life examined, corruption in the foreign aid sector is the only one where respondent's left-right political self-identification emerges as a statistically significant factor.

Examining the size of the effects, we see that trust in governmental agencies carries the largest effect, where a change from the lowest to the highest level of trust corresponds to a decrease in corruption perception of about 36 percentage points. Moving the four steps from being "clearly to the left" to "clearly to the right" is associated with a 23 percentage points increase in corruption perception, while an equivalent change in generalized trust corresponds to a 15 percentage point decrease in corruption perceptions.

Beyond the attitudinal variables, we find that among the socio-economic characteristics, only occupation matters for corruption perceptions. Specifically, belonging to occupation group 2 (employee with managerial responsibility) is associated with an increase of approximately 6 percentage points in corruption perception, compared to the reference group (employees).

The coefficient for education is negatively signed throughout the models and remains statistically significant in all but the final two models, where generalized trust and the respondent's positioning on the left-right political scale is included. The negative sign indicates that more educated respondents tend to perceive less corruption in the foreign aid sector.

Figure 8: Corruption Perception in the Foreign Aid Sector: Statistically Significant Predictors



Examining the effects of the party respondents voted for in the most recent parliamentary election on corruption perception in the foreign aid sector, we find that respondents who voted for the Centre Party (C: Centerpartiet) on average perceive less corruption (by 10 to 15 percentage points) in this sector, compared to partisans voting for S, MP and ‘Other’, but not for any of the remaining parties. Notably, we find no statistically significant effect of voting for the far right Sweden Democrats on the perception of corruption.

The effect of the local socio-economic and political contexts, as proxied by municipality fixed effects, accounts for nearly a quarter of the variance in the dependent variable. The final model, which includes all predictors, explains 44% of the variance in the perception of corruption in Swedish foreign aid.

### 3 Discussion

Our analysis revealed the importance of **attitudinal variables** in shaping respondents' perceptions of corruption across the examined sectors of public life. Among the attitudinal variables examined, generalized trust consistently emerged as statistically significant across all analyses. This finding aligns with the well-established theoretical (Uslaner, 2002) and empirical evidence (Morris & Klesner, 2010; Richey, 2010) linking social trust and corruption.

What is particularly striking, however, is the consistency with which generalized trust is associated with perceptions of corruption in various areas of public life. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, the impact of generalized trust is of comparable magnitude across the sectors, with a slightly higher effect size observed in the civil service analysis.

Another important attitudinal variable that we found to be associated with perceptions of corruption is trust in government. This variable is statistically significant in three out of the four analyses in which it was included: politicians, police and foreign aid (it was excluded from the civil service analysis).

Table 2: Size of the Generalized Trust's Coefficient Across Five Analyses

<b>Category</b>	<b>Value</b>
Foreign aid	-0.103
Healthcare workers	-0.0997
Police	-0.101
Politicians	-0.0893
Civil servants	-0.158

It is important to note that our analysis treats both types of trust as explanatory factors for corruption perceptions. However, the relationship may also operate in the opposite direction, with perceptions of corruption influencing levels of trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Uslaner, 2002). Given the cross-sectional and observational nature of the data used in this study, this potential endogeneity issue cannot be fully resolved and should be considered when interpreting the results.

The final attitudinal variable that emerges as an important predictor of corruption perceptions is satisfaction with democracy. This variable remains statistically significant in two analyses—politicians and civil servants. Its quantitative impact is notable: moving from the lowest to the highest level of satisfaction with democracy corresponds to a 20 to 25 percentage point decrease in perceived corruption. However, beyond these three factors, no other attitudinal variable reached the threshold of statistical significance across multiple analyses.

Some **socio-economic characteristics** of respondents emerge as statistically significant predictors of certain corruption perceptions, however, none of these characteristics consistently predict corruption perceptions across all areas of public life. Education, for instance, was statistically significant in explaining corruption perceptions in public administration, although the effect size was quite small. Additionally, occupation type – albeit involving different occupational groups – influenced perceptions of corruption in the political elite and foreign aid sectors.

We found that female respondents perceived higher corruption in the public health sector, although the size of this effect is rather small. This difference could be due to the fact that women, on average, utilize healthcare services more frequently than men (Osika Friberg et al., 2016). As a “significant portion” of this disparity is attributed to maternity and childbirth care (Swedish Gender Equality Agency, nd), this may shape women’s perceptions of healthcare practices and potentially influence their views on corruption within the sector.

The perception of corruption within law enforcement is particularly important given the critical role the police play in maintaining public trust and upholding the rule of law. Our finding that younger individuals are more likely to perceive corruption in the police is therefore concerning. As noted by Rothstein (2013), “compared to other political institutions that exercise public policy, the courts, the police, and the other legal institutions of the state have a special task: to detect and punish people who, in game theory parlance, use opportunistic strategies” (p. 1017). If younger generations, who are currently skeptical of the police, maintain this attitude into later stages of their lives, it could negatively affect the authority and legitimacy of one of society’s key institutions responsible for combating opportunism and corruption.

Finally, none of the **behavioral characteristics** of the respondents exhibited consistent patterns in their influence on perceptions of corruption. This may be due to their effects being mediated through other variables (e.g., satisfaction with democracy), imprecise measurement (e.g., in the case of political participation), or other unidentified factors. These potential explanations should be considered when interpreting the results.

Our findings should also be interpreted within the Swedish context, as corruption and corruption perception “depend on how a society understands the rules and what constitutes a deviation” (Melgar et al., 2010, p. 120). Sweden is consistently viewed as one of the least corrupt countries globally by both international watchdogs, such as Transparency International and by academics (Andersson, 2003; Erlingsson & Kristinsson, 2020). This suggests that both the extent and nature of corruption may differ in Sweden (Andersson, 2003; Bauhr et al., 2010; Erlingsson & Kristinsson, 2016) compared to countries where corruption is endemic, such as, for example, many of Sweden’s partner nations receiving international development assistance (Nistotskaya et al., 2024).

For instance, Bauhr et al. (2010) shown that corruption in Sweden rarely takes the form of bribes. Their research revealed that only four percent of respondents in the 2010 SOM Institute survey believed public sector employees would request fees for performing their duties, while 16% believed a public sector doctor might help a friend or relative advance in the healthcare queue (Bauhr et al., 2010, p. 9, 14). This aligns with Erlingsson & Kristinsson (2016)’s findings in Iceland, another of the least corrupt countries, which showed that “less serious types of corruption, such as favoritism in public appointments and failure to disclose information, are more common than more serious forms such as extortion, bribes, and embezzlement” (p. 22). The unique context of Sweden in terms of corruption-related exceptionalism limits the extent to which the findings of this study can be generalized to other countries or settings.

Additionally, it is noteworthy that when the survey from which our data is drawn was conducted, Swedes ranked corruption among their lowest concerns when considering future challenges (Table 1). While Swedish citizens may attribute relatively high levels of corruption to

specific areas of public life, such as foreign aid, corruption itself is not regarded as a particularly urgent issue.

Finally, it is crucial to highlight the limitations of using citizen surveys to measure corruption. Research on corruption indicates that responses to survey questions about corruption are often influenced by social desirability bias and the political views of respondents, both of which can distort the accuracy of the findings (Agerberg, 2022).

## **4 Conclusion**

Perception of corruption that individuals hold matter for many aspects of social life. Existing research indicates that these perceptions not only provide insight on to the actual level of corruption but also shape trust in political institutions and influence interpersonal relationships, with potential cascading effects on socio-economic and political dynamics within society (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Melgar et al., 2010; Morris & Klesner, 2010; Richey, 2010).

Perception of corruption is not only a shared social norm, formed by societal dynamics (Rothstein, 2011a), it is also shaped by individual experiences, values and views (Melgar et al., 2010). In both corruption-free and corruption-rampant societies, there are individuals who would never engage in corrupt practices, those that might find them justifiable under certain circumstances, and still others may engage in corruption regularly. This study aimed to examine the individual-level factors that underpin corruption perceptions of Swedish citizens, using the data from a reputable nationwide survey.

We analyzed the individual-level drivers of corruption perceptions that Swedish citizens hold about their politicians, civil servants, police, public health, and foreign aid. Our first finding is that respondents hold differing perceptions of corruption across these areas: the foreign aid sector is perceived as affected by corruption the most, while politics and civil service are viewed as having high corruption levels, followed by a moderate perception of corruption in the police,

and relatively low perceptions of corruption in public health.

This finding suggests that citizens are more likely to have sector-specific perceptions of corruption, rather than a singular, unified view. If this is the case, this adds to the critique of the validity of single-point estimate measures of corruption perceptions, raised by scholars and practitioners in the field (David-Barrett, 2024), and underscores the need for more granular indicators to capture the complexities of public attitudes toward corruption. This conclusion is further supported by the findings from our analysis, which reveals that only one variable –generalized trust – was a statistically significant predictor of corruption perception in all sectors. Beyond that, only two variables – trust in agencies and satisfaction with democracy – were significant in more than one analysis. Other variables influencing perceptions of corruption appear to be sector-specific, further reinforcing the argument that there is no singular, unified perception of corruption.

This finding is in line with emerging literature on corruption which critiques extant theoretizations of corruption as overly generic (Heywood, 2017; Hutchinson et al., 2020; Khan & Pallavi, 2022; Pyman, 2020), pointing instead that corruption varies not only between countries, but also within them, across levels of government, sectors, professional domains, and organizations (for a review of this literature see Nistotskaya et al. (2024), pp.48-58).

Our second finding is that, among the three families of individual-level factors – attitudinal, socio-economic, and behavioral – only attitudinal factors displayed a sort of patterned influence on corruption perceptions across different areas of public life. However, this conclusion should be viewed with caution, as the direction of the relationships between trust in government and social trust, on the one hand, and corruption perceptions, on the other, could not be adjudicated with the data available. Most socio-economic and behavioral variables appeared to influence corruption perceptions only within specific sectors, further suggesting that corruption perception is a sector-specific phenomenon.

While Sweden remains one of the least corrupt countries in the world, it is important to periodically measure and examine perceptions of corruption in different sectors of public life as one of

the means of ensuring that the abuse of entrusted power for private gain remains the exception, not the rule. In other words, by regularly examining discolorations in skillets, we stay vigilant to guarantee that nothing more troubling is happening in the kitchen.

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# Appendices

## A Descriptive statistics

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Corr Perc Pub	1,371	3.84	1.63	1	7
Corr Perc Aid	1,262	4.65	1.84	1	7
CorrPerc Police	1,408	2.72	1.44	1	7
CorrPerc Health	1,406	1.95	1.21	1	7
CorrPerc Politicians	1,410	4.02	1.67	1	7
Age	1,751	54.18	19.34	17	91
Age_sq	1,751	3309	2072	289	8281
Sex	1,820	0.48	0.5	0	1
Educ	1,742	5.38	2.7	1	10
Partnr	1,756	-0.74	0.44	0	1
Occupation	1,577	1.4	0.64	1	3
Income	1,731	5.52	3.34	1	15
PolActive	1,708	1.08	0.32	1	3
PartyVoted	1,487	4.36	2.49	1	10
DemSatis	1,766	2.82	0.74	1	4
AgencyTrust	1,750	2.82	0.68	1	4
GenTrust	1,764	6.3	2.21	1	11
LRScale	1,767	3.04	1.27	1	5

Table A2: Description of Independent Variables

Variable	Description	Measurement
Age	Respondent's age	Continuous
Age <sup>2</sup>	Respondent's age squared	Continuous
Gender	Self-declared	0 = Woman; 1 = Man
Education	Highest level of education	1 = Compulsory, <9 years; 2 = Compulsory, >9 years; 3 = Gymnasium, <3 years; 4 = Gymnasium, 3 years or more; 5 = Vocational, <3 years; 6 = Vocational, 3 years or more; 7 = University, <3 years; 8 = University, more than 3, yet no more than 4; 9 = University 4 years or more; 10 = Postgraduate
Family status	Married/in partnership or not	0 = No; 1 = Yes
Occupations	Occupation	1 = Employee (ref); 2 = Employee w/managerial duties; 3 = Self-employed
Income individual	Individual income, monthly, thousand SEK	1 = <10; 2 = 10-14,9; 3 = 15-19,9; 4 = 20-24,9; 5 = 25-29,9; 6 = 30-34,9; 7 = 35-39,9; 8 = 40-44,9; 9 = 45-49,9; 10 = 50-54,9; 11 = 55-59,9; 12 = 60-64,9; 13 = 65-69,9; 14 = 70-74,9; 15 = >75.
Income household	Household income, yearly, thousand SEK	1 = 100 or less; 2 = 101-200; 3 = 201-300; 4 = 301-400; 5 = 401-500; 6 = 501-600; 7 = 601-700; 8 = 701-800; 9 = 801-900; 10 = 901-1000; 11 = 1001-1100; 12 = More than 1100.
Satisfaction with Democracy	Generally, how satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in Sweden?	1 = Not at all; 2 = Not particularly; 3 = Pretty satisfied; 4 = Very satisfied
Trust in government departments	Generally, how much confidence do you have in Swedish governmental departments?	1 = Very little; 2 = Relatively low; 3 = Relatively high; 4 = Very high confidence
Generalized trust	Trust in fellow citizens	1 = It is not possible to trust people, generally ... 10 = It is possible to trust people generally
Left-right position	Position on the left-right political spectrum	1 = Clearly to the left; 2 = Somewhat to the left; 3 = Neither left nor right; 4 = Somewhat to the right; 5 = Clearly to the right
Political participation	Are you a member of a political party/organisation?	1 = No(ref); 2 = Yes; 3 = Yes, and I have some type of function within it
Party voted in the last elections	Political party responded voted for	S, SD, M, V, C, L, KD, and MP

# B Main Analysis

Table B1: Corruption among Politicians: Full Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11	CorrPerc_11
Age	0.00948 (0.0135)	0.0267 (0.0145)	0.0141 (0.0163)	0.0252 (0.0175)	0.0297 (0.0203)	0.0280 (0.0206)	-0.00456 (0.0226)	-0.0106 (0.0219)	-0.0106 (0.0224)	-0.0106 (0.0225)
Age_sq	-0.000122 (0.000128)	-0.000295* (0.000137)	-0.000202 (0.000151)	-0.000350* (0.000164)	-0.000367 (0.000191)	-0.000349 (0.000194)	-0.0000296 (0.000212)	0.0000121 (0.000208)	0.0000269 (0.000210)	0.0000277 (0.000210)
Sex	-0.0125 (0.0511)	-0.0766 (0.0978)	-0.0231 (0.100)	-0.0904 (0.133)	-0.0975 (0.134)	-0.0675 (0.151)	-0.0379 (0.141)	-0.00637 (0.130)	-0.00385 (0.131)	-0.00385 (0.131)
Educ	-0.0675*** (0.0182)	-0.0715*** (0.0158)	-0.0549* (0.0212)	-0.0431 (0.0260)	-0.0440 (0.0260)	-0.0388 (0.0286)	-0.0214 (0.0297)	0.00593 (0.0269)	0.00627 (0.0270)	0.00627 (0.0270)
Partnr	-0.166 (0.108)	-0.224 (0.116)	-0.193 (0.117)	-0.163 (0.141)	-0.164 (0.142)	-0.235 (0.180)	-0.142 (0.176)	-0.0891 (0.176)	-0.0891 (0.176)	-0.0891 (0.176)
1.Occupation		0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.Occupation		-0.0153 (0.115)	0.0677 (0.119)	0.132 (0.134)	0.136 (0.134)	0.152 (0.151)	0.224 (0.151)	0.260 (0.152)	0.251 (0.152)	0.251 (0.152)
3.Occupation		0.216 (0.181)	0.236 (0.181)	0.311 (0.246)	0.299 (0.246)	0.411 (0.226)	0.497* (0.216)	0.520* (0.202)	0.525** (0.201)	0.525** (0.201)
Income			-0.0437* (0.0178)	-0.0388* (0.0174)	-0.0383* (0.0173)	-0.00952 (0.0216)	-0.00417 (0.0229)	0.0134 (0.0216)	0.0149 (0.0230)	0.0149 (0.0230)
Municipality fixed effects				Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
1.PolActive					0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.PolActive					0.0709 (0.277)	-0.161 (0.284)	-0.126 (0.242)	-0.109 (0.226)	-0.112 (0.225)	-0.112 (0.225)
3.PolActive					-0.251 (0.475)	-0.309 (0.465)	0.0154 (0.395)	0.0797 (0.340)	0.0605 (0.340)	0.0605 (0.340)
Party Voted fixed effects						Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
DemSatis							-0.831*** (0.0816)	-0.428*** (0.0822)	-0.429*** (0.0821)	-0.429*** (0.0821)
AgencyTrust								-0.518*** (0.104)	-0.519*** (0.104)	-0.519*** (0.104)
GenTrust								-0.0971** (0.0329)	-0.0893** (0.0332)	-0.0893** (0.0332)
LRscale									-0.0342 (0.0724)	-0.0342 (0.0724)
_cons	3.895*** (0.325)	4.052*** (0.340)	4.525*** (0.401)	4.280*** (0.414)	5.212*** (0.506)	5.235*** (0.529)	6.397*** (0.715)	8.459*** (0.643)	9.882*** (0.639)	9.972*** (0.682)
N	1383	1369	1239	1227	1227	1221	1090	1054	1044	1041
R-sq	0.002	0.015	0.019	0.024	0.204	0.204	0.255	0.348	0.432	0.432

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Figure B1: Corruption among Politicians: Statistically Not Significant Predictors




Table B2: Corruption among Civil Servant: Full Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl	CorrPerc_~bl
Age	0.0135 (0.0137)	0.0367** (0.0143)	0.0200 (0.0161)	0.0409* (0.0173)	0.0321 (0.0194)	0.0803 (0.0202)	0.00816 (0.0211)	0.00430 (0.0207)	0.0106 (0.0210)	0.0120 (0.0211)
Age_sq	-0.000114 (0.000125)	-0.000368** (0.000135)	-0.000237 (0.000149)	-0.000442** (0.000161)	-0.000389* (0.000186)	-0.000370 (0.000189)	-0.000114 (0.000155)	-0.000129 (0.000152)	-0.000161 (0.000156)	-0.000175 (0.000157)
Sex		-0.00966 (0.0892)	-0.0189 (0.0951)	0.0555 (0.0974)	-0.0769 (0.134)	-0.0706 (0.138)	-0.0531 (0.151)	-0.0345 (0.137)	-0.0296 (0.136)	-0.0278 (0.139)
Educ		-0.130*** (0.0178)	-0.141*** (0.0191)	-0.118*** (0.0204)	-0.105*** (0.0251)	-0.107*** (0.0249)	-0.0974*** (0.0262)	-0.0930*** (0.0271)	-0.0840** (0.0275)	-0.0830** (0.0276)
Partnr		-0.0861 (0.106)	-0.180 (0.113)	-0.139 (0.113)	-0.152 (0.128)	-0.137 (0.127)	-0.164 (0.143)	-0.0890 (0.141)	-0.0647 (0.144)	-0.0525 (0.149)
1.Occupation		0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.Occupation			0.0173 (0.112)	0.129 (0.115)	0.169 (0.131)	0.156 (0.130)	0.160 (0.147)	0.269 (0.144)	0.273 (0.139)	0.268 (0.139)
3.Occupation			0.361* (0.176)	0.396* (0.176)	0.558* (0.225)	0.542* (0.228)	0.600* (0.246)	0.654** (0.230)	0.632** (0.222)	0.636** (0.218)
Income				-0.0593*** (0.0171)	-0.0470** (0.0179)	-0.0469** (0.0177)	-0.0276 (0.0201)	-0.0261 (0.0200)	-0.0118 (0.0197)	-0.0114 (0.0201)
Municipality fixed effects				Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
1.PolActive						0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.PolActive						-0.0886 (0.276)	-0.203 (0.274)	-0.147 (0.245)	-0.141 (0.233)	-0.139 (0.234)
3.PolActive						0.177 (0.467)	0.118 (0.416)	0.346 (0.383)	0.356 (0.371)	0.339 (0.370)
Party Voted fixed effects							Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
DemSatis								-0.642*** (0.0805)	-0.644*** (0.0786)	-0.644*** (0.0778)
GenTrust									-0.153*** (0.0320)	-0.158*** (0.0327)
LRscale										-0.0414 (0.0797)
_cons	3.478*** (0.336)	3.949*** (0.342)	4.450*** (0.402)	4.120*** (0.415)	5.833*** (0.479)	5.877*** (0.490)	6.447*** (0.720)	8.008*** (0.695)	8.183*** (0.662)	8.273*** (0.665)
N	1247	1332	1200	1196	1196	1190	1059	1096	1030	1026
R-sq	0.001	0.042	0.053	0.063	0.239	0.237	0.257	0.359	0.385	0.388

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Figure B2: Corruption among Civil Servants: Statistically Not Significant Predictors




Table B3: Corruption among Public Health Workers: Full Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1	CorrPerc_H=1
Age	-0.0238* (0.00981)	-0.0143 (0.0105)	-0.0174 (0.0114)	-0.00258 (0.0132)	-0.00305 (0.0166)	-0.00427 (0.0160)	-0.0240 (0.0154)	-0.0361 (0.0163)	-0.0153 (0.0159)	-0.0156 (0.0161)
Age_sq	0.000225* (0.0000930)	0.000124 (0.0000593)	0.000173 (0.000106)	0.0000221 (0.000114)	0.0000179 (0.000148)	0.0000418 (0.000143)	0.000208 (0.000142)	0.000231 (0.000150)	0.000188 (0.000147)	0.000151 (0.000148)
Sex		-0.164* (0.0656)	-0.213** (0.0675)	-0.154* (0.0650)	-0.164 (0.0517)	-0.153 (0.0514)	-0.181* (0.0760)	-0.195** (0.0636)	-0.182** (0.0636)	-0.185** (0.0706)
Educ		-0.0216 (0.0131)	-0.0210 (0.0137)	-0.00135 (0.0148)	0.00114 (0.0178)	-0.000710 (0.0175)	0.00691 (0.0170)	0.0150 (0.0161)	0.0250 (0.0159)	0.0252 (0.0160)
Partnr		-0.139 (0.0779)	-0.163* (0.0806)	-0.130 (0.0802)	-0.195 (0.105)	-0.170 (0.103)	-0.0256 (0.0943)	-0.0123 (0.0920)	0.0391 (0.0886)	0.0390 (0.0886)
1.Occupation		0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.Occupation		0.0622 (0.0804)	0.143 (0.0823)	0.124 (0.104)	0.127 (0.105)	0.0373 (0.0958)	0.0231 (0.0984)	0.0337 (0.0966)	0.0266 (0.0974)	0.0266 (0.0974)
3.Occupation		-0.0394 (0.126)	-0.0440 (0.125)	-0.0832 (0.141)	-0.0647 (0.141)	-0.0418 (0.145)	-0.0426 (0.148)	-0.0633 (0.135)	-0.0730 (0.137)	-0.0730 (0.137)
Income			-0.0449*** (0.0123)	-0.0413*** (0.0123)	-0.0410** (0.0123)	-0.0204 (0.0129)	-0.0169 (0.0129)	-0.00737 (0.0132)	-0.00919 (0.0139)	-0.00919 (0.0139)
Municipality fixed effects				Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
1.PolActive				0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.PolActive				0.0396 (0.180)	0.0396 (0.190)	0.0396 (0.190)	0.0944 (0.181)	0.0904 (0.169)	0.0556 (0.170)	0.0556 (0.170)
3.PolActive				0.175 (0.251)	0.241 (0.254)	0.241 (0.254)	0.311 (0.263)	0.304 (0.279)	0.323 (0.283)	0.323 (0.283)
Party Voted fixed effects						Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
DemSatis							-0.251*** (0.0637)	-0.116 (0.0748)	-0.116 (0.0744)	-0.116 (0.0744)
AgencyTrust								-0.186 (0.0866)	-0.185 (0.0869)	-0.185 (0.0869)
GenTrust								-0.101*** (0.0229)	-0.0997*** (0.0233)	-0.0997*** (0.0233)
LRscale									0.0383 (0.0541)	0.0383 (0.0541)
_cons	2.494*** (0.239)	2.582*** (0.245)	2.623*** (0.280)	2.380*** (0.287)	2.202*** (0.412)	2.266*** (0.406)	2.266*** (0.419)	2.946*** (0.438)	3.298*** (0.424)	3.217*** (0.420)
N	1380	1367	1240	1229	1229	1222	1088	1062	1052	1049
R-sq	0.004	0.013	0.018	0.029	0.234	0.234	0.286	0.325	0.363	0.364

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Figure B3: Corruption among Public Health Workers: Statistically Not Significant Predictors




Table B4: Corruption among Police: Full Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el	CorrPerc_el
Age	-0.0456*** (0.0115)	-0.0304** (0.0123)	-0.0400** (0.0135)	-0.0320* (0.0145)	-0.0284 (0.0153)	-0.0286 (0.0156)	-0.0584** (0.0180)	-0.0596** (0.0183)	-0.0551** (0.0181)	-0.0576** (0.0182)
Age_sq	0.000379*** (0.000109)	0.000229** (0.000116)	0.000308* (0.000125)	0.000230 (0.000136)	0.000179 (0.000140)	0.000193 (0.000143)	0.000461** (0.000163)	0.000476** (0.000167)	0.000478** (0.000167)	0.000476** (0.000167)
Sex		-0.157* (0.0771)	-0.241** (0.0809)	-0.201* (0.0828)	-0.155 (0.103)	-0.201 (0.103)	-0.225* (0.101)	-0.217* (0.101)	-0.197* (0.0963)	-0.192 (0.0980)
Educ		-0.0488** (0.0154)	-0.0613** (0.0163)	-0.0574* (0.0174)	-0.0336 (0.0262)	-0.0354 (0.0264)	-0.0266 (0.0253)	-0.0237 (0.0258)	0.000875 (0.0244)	0.00100 (0.0246)
Partnr		-0.249** (0.0917)	-0.245* (0.0961)	-0.217* (0.0962)	-0.216 (0.112)	-0.217 (0.112)	-0.191 (0.140)	-0.144 (0.145)	-0.0876 (0.139)	-0.0906 (0.139)
1.Occupation		0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.Occupation		0.0442 (0.0952)	0.105 (0.0979)	0.105 (0.0979)	0.0789 (0.113)	0.0779 (0.116)	0.0703 (0.144)	0.110 (0.137)	0.124 (0.138)	0.131 (0.139)
3.Occupation		0.0309 (0.148)	0.0346 (0.147)	0.0212 (0.173)	0.0443 (0.173)	0.0443 (0.173)	0.0957 (0.162)	0.0670 (0.147)	0.0618 (0.139)	0.0757 (0.139)
Income			-0.0250* (0.0147)	-0.0327 (0.0176)	-0.0315 (0.0176)	-0.0315 (0.0176)	-0.00729 (0.0216)	-0.00491 (0.0237)	-0.00769 (0.0232)	0.0106 (0.0224)
Municipality fixed effects				Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
1.PolActive					0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.PolActive						-0.170 (0.207)	-0.224 (0.208)	-0.210 (0.191)	-0.193 (0.191)	-0.199 (0.194)
3.PolActive						0.0582 (0.350)	0.0528 (0.310)	0.248 (0.274)	0.237 (0.286)	0.207 (0.284)
Party Voted fixed effects						Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
DemSatis							-0.353*** (0.0909)	-0.0370 (0.0847)	-0.0369 (0.0845)	-0.0369 (0.0845)
AgencyTrust								-0.654*** (0.0994)	-0.654*** (0.0991)	-0.654*** (0.0991)
GenTrust								-0.0993** (0.0296)	-0.101*** (0.0294)	-0.101*** (0.0294)
LRscale										-0.0664 (0.0701)
_cons	3.920*** (0.280)	4.134*** (0.286)	4.415*** (0.331)	4.267*** (0.341)	5.149*** (0.427)	5.156*** (0.436)	5.627*** (0.616)	6.558*** (0.641)	7.527*** (0.616)	7.693*** (0.644)
N	1393	1370	1340	1329	1329	1322	1088	1064	1054	1051
R-sq	0.015	0.033	0.038	0.041	0.203	0.204	0.242	0.272	0.353	0.353

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Figure B4: Corruption among Police: Statistically Not Significant Predictors





Table B5: Corruption among Foreign Aid Officials: Full Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1	CorrPerc_A=1
Age	0.0406* (0.0163)	0.0535** (0.0173)	0.0394 (0.0153)	0.0320 (0.0206)	0.0321 (0.0281)	0.0371 (0.0276)	0.0194 (0.0252)	0.0127 (0.0332)	0.0197 (0.0332)	0.0176 (0.0319)
Age_sq	-0.000253 (0.000152)	-0.000401* (0.000161)	-0.000261 (0.000176)	-0.000247 (0.000190)	-0.000274 (0.000256)	-0.000300 (0.000252)	-0.000125 (0.000276)	-0.0000633 (0.000308)	-0.000116 (0.000252)	-0.0000958 (0.000252)
Sex		0.0740 (0.108)	-0.00858 (0.111)	0.00658 (0.115)	-0.0454 (0.142)	-0.0657 (0.139)	-0.0489 (0.128)	-0.0466 (0.135)	-0.0208 (0.136)	-0.0619 (0.133)
Educ		-0.0905*** (0.0205)	-0.115*** (0.0221)	-0.115*** (0.0240)	-0.118*** (0.0302)	-0.120*** (0.0305)	-0.0769* (0.0313)	-0.0781* (0.0325)	-0.0544 (0.0316)	-0.0637 (0.0310)
Partnr		0.0205 (0.126)	-0.0183 (0.132)	-0.00767 (0.134)	0.0208 (0.158)	-0.00123 (0.151)	0.00935 (0.159)	0.0479 (0.169)	0.126 (0.170)	0.116 (0.169)
1.Occupation		0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.Occupation		0.209 (0.129)	0.218 (0.134)	0.324* (0.157)	0.314* (0.155)	0.294 (0.171)	0.420* (0.163)	0.412* (0.165)	0.373* (0.163)	0.373* (0.163)
3.Occupation		0.375 (0.202)	0.356 (0.204)	0.491 (0.288)	0.465 (0.291)	0.326 (0.267)	0.413 (0.254)	0.349 (0.238)	0.288 (0.238)	0.288 (0.238)
Income				-0.00286 (0.0200)	0.00606 (0.0268)	0.00450 (0.0256)	0.0132 (0.0298)	0.0195 (0.0325)	0.0362 (0.0281)	0.0197 (0.0303)
Municipality fixed effects				Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
1.PolActive						0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
2.PolActive						-0.0853 (0.358)	-0.194 (0.347)	-0.175 (0.344)	-0.200 (0.318)	-0.173 (0.300)
3.PolActive						0.0171 (0.705)	0.0260 (0.576)	0.326 (0.553)	0.398 (0.560)	0.529 (0.580)
Party Voted fixed effects							Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)	Yes (.)
DemSatis								-0.541*** (0.0959)	-0.175 (0.106)	-0.180 (0.106)
AgencyTrust									-0.753*** (0.129)	-0.727*** (0.129)
GenTrust									-0.112** (0.0374)	-0.103** (0.0364)
LRscale										0.347*** (0.0880)
_cons	3.267*** (0.407)	3.494*** (0.422)	4.289*** (0.450)	4.300*** (0.505)	6.014*** (0.650)	5.944*** (0.640)	5.364*** (0.682)	6.928*** (0.856)	7.966*** (0.819)	7.217*** (0.848)
N	1343	1229	1119	1105	1105	1059	993	963	955	951
R-sq	0.021	0.038	0.039	0.040	0.230	0.234	0.335	0.370	0.424	0.442

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Figure B5: Corruption among Foreign Aid: Statistically Not Significant Predictors



## C Main Analysis Party Voted for effects - Significant results

Table C1: Results for Civil Servants by Party

Party Ref. Group	S	SD	M	V	C	L	KD	MP	Other	Blank
V										
S										
C		-0.70 (0.30)							-1.01 (0.43)	
L									-0.90 (0.40)	
M										
KD										
MP									-0.92 (0.44)	
SD					0.70 (0.30)					
Other					1.10 (0.49)	0.90 (0.40)		0.92 (0.44)		
Blank										

Table C2: Results for Foreign Aid by Party

Party Ref. Group	S	SD	M	V	C	L	KD	MP	Other	Blank
V										
S					0.61 (0.30)					
C	-0.61 (0.30)							-0.72 (0.31)	-0.90 (0.40)	
L										
M										
KD										
MP					0.72 (0.31)					
SD										
Other					0.90 (0.40)					
Blank										

Table C3: Results for Politicians by Party

Party Ref. Group	S	SD	M	V	C	L	KD	MP	Other	Blank
V										
S							0.60 (0.30)			
C										
L										
M										
KD	-0.60 (0.30)									
MP										
SD										
Other										
Blank										

Table C4: Results for Police by Party

Party Ref. Group	S	SD	M	V	C	L	KD	MP	Other	Blank
V										
S							0.54 (0.25)			
C										
L							0.49 (0.23)			
M										
KD	-0.54 (0.25)					-0.49 (0.23)				
MP										
SD										
Other										
Blank										

Table C5: Results for Healthcare by Party

Party Ref. Group	S	SD	M	V	C	L	KD	MP	Other	Blank
V									-0.74 (0.37)	-1.18 (0.50)
S										
C										-1.08 (0.51)
L										
M										-1.16 (0.51)
KD										-1.13 (0.50)
MP										
SD										-1.20 (0.54)
Other				0.74 (0.37)						
Blank		1.20 (0.54)	1.16 (0.51)	1.18 (0.50)	1.08 (0.51)		1.13 (0.50)			

## D Public Concern

List of survey questions informing the 1 graph.

**Considering the current situation today, how concerned do you feel about the following issues regarding the future?** Respondents ranked each issue as: Very concerned, Quite concerned, Not very concerned, or Not at all concerned.

- Changes in the Earth's climate
- Economic crisis
- Political extremism
- Global epidemics
- Organized crime
- Deterioration of the marine environment
- Increase in refugees
- Increased drug use
- Military conflicts
- Restrictions on freedom of speech
- Increased stress in working life
- Precarious employment conditions
- The situation in Russia
- Restrictions on personal freedom
- Digital surveillance
- A new world war
- High unemployment
- Environmental degradation
- Weakened democracy
- Deterioration in welfare
- Terrorism
- Increased xenophobia
- Housing shortage
- Increased antibiotic resistance
- Ethnic tensions
- Increased social inequality
- Corruption
- Cyberattacks against authorities
- Increased inflation