Preferences for Segregation? A study of migrants and hosts in Adana, Turkey*

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Do segregated migrant neighborhoods indicate "preferences for segregation?" Are preferences symmetric across host and migrant communities? Recent work examining population movement in Western Europe suggests that the answer to both questions is yes, implying that Spatial Assimilation Theory may not hold for Europe's recent migrants and failures of integration are a "two-way street" that reflect both host and migrant preferences. These findings, which come primarily from a few Northern European countries, cannot fully isolate in-group preferences from other factors that contribute to population movement. To address this limitation and explore a new case, our study explores immigrant inclusion at the neighborhood level through a conjoint experiment examining simultaneous migrant and host community preferences for residential segregation in Turkey, a country that hosts more Syrian migrants than any other country in the world. We implemented the experiment through a 5000 person door-to-door survey in Adana, Turkey that draws equally from migrant (Syrian) and host (Turk) populations. The primary focus of the conjoint is on out-group size at its impact on willingness to move to the neighborhood. We find, surprisingly, that Syrian migrants in Adana do not exhibit preferences for segregation; out-group size has no effect on their willingness to move to a neighborhood. In contrast, hosts do exhibit strong preferences for segregation, and these preferences correlate with many factors identified in the literature on anti-migrant discrimination: economic insecurity, cultural purity concerns, and religiosity. Our findings suggest that if migrant integration is a "two way street," then one side of this street appears far more open than the other.

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1 Introduction

Segregated "migrant" neighborhoods are a common and contentious feature in countries experiencing high levels of incoming migration. In Europe, where migration of refugees fleeing civil conflicts like the Syrian civil war grew rapidly during the past two decades and housing is a key arena of immigration conflict (Dancygier, 2010), these enclaves are "a major political concern" (Andersson, Berg and Dahlberg, 2021). Policymakers take the existence of enclaves as evidence of a failure of integration, places where migrants live cut off from host society, unable to experience the contact with host citizens that purportedly promotes assimilation, and worry that they seed extremism and cultural incoherence. In Turkey, the focus of this paper, recent government legislation restricts migrant-dense neighborhoods from new migrant settlement. But does the existence of segregated migrant neighborhoods actually indicate that migrants desire to live apart from host society?

A growing set of studies, analyzing administrative data on residential mobility in Western Europe, suggests that segregated migrant communities indeed reflect a preference for segregation on the part of migrants. This research finds that Europe's migrants often do not leave migrant enclaves, even when they have the resources to do so. Moreover, migrants actively select into migrant communities when not initially placed in them (Bolt, Van Kempen and Van Ham, 2008; Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013; Schaake, Burgers and Mulder, 2010; Anderson, 2008; Andersson, 1998; Damm, 2009; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008; Åslund, 2005; Boschman and Van Ham, 2015). These findings appear across multiple northern European countries and are strongest for the most culturally dissimilar migrant groups. Consequently, some researchers conclude that "spatial assimilation theory," a core idea in American studies of segregation predicting that migrants seek to leave enclaves and integrate into host society as they gain socioeconomic and cultural resources (Massey and Denton, 1985; Massey, 1985), may not apply to Europe's current wave of migrants.

The administrative data underpinning European findings permits granular analysis of individuals moving into and out of neighborhoods and clustering with co-ethnics in space. Yet, it cannot provide insights into *why* people move to or stay in segregated spaces and whether these decisions specifically reflect preferences for living with co-ethnics or resistance to integration. Research using administrative data is also not possible to replicate in places that do not maintain or allow public access to this kind of data, i.e. most areas outside of Northern Europe. Which brings us to a second issue: scope. Work on racial integration in the US reveals a more varied picture of incoming-group preferences (Krysan and Farley, 2002; Hochschild, Piston and Weaver, 2021). The finding that the least culturally similar groups in Europe appear to "prefer" enclaves points to the potential for variation across contexts and the importance of extending work beyond Europe.

In this paper, we make two important contributions to the literature on host and migrant preferences for segregation. First, we consider a less studied context, Turkey. Turkey has experienced massive in-migration of refugees from the Syrian civil war. Most Syrians do not have, and will not have for the foreseeable future, realistically safe options to return to Syria, raising the salience of where they will live if they stay in Turkey. Will Syrians seek to integrate into Turkish neighborhoods? Will Turks leave, stay, or attempt to block Syrian neighbors? These questions have urgency on the ground in Turkey as both Syrians and Turks attempt to manage the daily challenges of integration. Turkey offers a valuable comparative context to the European studies of migrant segregation, one with at least a superficially smaller cultural gap between hosts and migrants than found in many European countries. Turks and Syrians share a common religion (Islam), regional proximity, and some cultural similarities (although not a common language).

Second, we deploy a different measurement strategy, implementing a large-scale door-to-door survey with an embedded conjoint experiment delivered to both host and migrant populations. Our experiment manipulates the features of a hypothetical neighborhood and

then asks respondents whether they would move to the neighborhood if they needed to leave their current home. The design allows us to consider simultaneously host and migrant preferences and to experimentally explore the effect of demographic composition on neighborhood preferences while isolating them from other important neighborhood features like class, crime, services, and social capital. The design also mitigates social desirability concerns by presenting neighborhoods as a bundle of features, allowing respondents to camouflage the specific role of co-ethnic preferences in their choices (Bansak et al., 2021). We complement this design with analysis of survey questions and in-depth interviews that explore identity, cultural and economic fears, and political preferences. Thus, we emerge with a fuller understanding of preferences and their motivations than work using only administrative data. Our design also has the advantage of being feasible in places like Adana, where administrative data has not been made available to the public (or does not exist). Of course, no study can do everything, and our study may reflect the idiosyncrasies of a particular place. It also measures stated preferences and individuals may misrepresent their true preferences for a variety of reasons. Our data nonetheless provides a critical complement to existing studies.

Our results contrast sharply with those of studies of segregation in Europe. We find that Syrian respondents in Adana gave very little consideration to neighborhood demographic composition, including the size of their own ethnic group, when evaluating the desirability of hypothetical neighborhoods. Instead, they placed much greater weight on neighborhood features like crime. In contrast, host society members, like their counterparts in many other places, gave great weight to neighborhood demographic composition, preferring neighborhoods where their own group was numerically dominant. Indeed, host citizens had a non-linear response to neighborhood composition, with very low tolerance of migrant composition greater than 20 percent. Host preferences for in-group neighborhoods were so intense that they would prefer to live in a higher crime neighborhood vs. one with a high proportion of migrants. In other words, we find strong evidence of asymmetry in preferences for segregation

between host and migrant communities in Adana. Hosts in our study wanted segregation; migrants did not.

We see two potential explanations for the difference between our findings and those of European studies. First, it is possible that our design would produce similar results if implemented in Europe. This would suggest that ethnic clustering by migrant populations in European countries does not in fact reflect a preference for living with co-ethnics, a possibility also advanced by Søholt and Lynnebakke (2015) and Anderson (2008), but rather other factors like fear of discrimination, violence in host neighborhoods, or actual discrimination in housing markets. That is, the difference in findings could be an artifact of the different methods used to investigate the research question. Second, it is possible that we are picking up genuine differences in preferences across context: migrants to Turkey do not wish to self-segregate, while migrants to Europe do. The fact that the European findings pertain most to culturally dissimilar migrants, and such cultural dissimilarity does not feature as prominently in the Turkish context, perhaps points to this interpretation. But only future research can determine whether this is in fact the case.

Our contribution is primarily empirical, but the goal is to inform both policy discussions and the development of future theories. Neighborhood diversity is believed to shape a large number of outcomes, from social trust (Putnam, 1997; Marschall and Stolle, 2004), to tolerance (Bowyer, 2009; Enos and Celaya, 2018), voting behaviors (Valdez, 2014; Vasilopoulos, McAvay and Brouard, 2022; Bratsberg et al., 2021), and attitudes towards immigration in general (Kaufmann and Harris, 2015). Understanding the origins of segregation, and the role that preferences play in producing it, is therefore important from a public policy standpoint. Moreover, ideas about preferences shape political discourse. The findings that migrants stay in migrant communities, even when they seem to have other options, potentially feeds a narrative summarized by Søholt and Lynnebakke (2015) that "Immigrants don't want to integrate. They prefer to stick together with co-ethnics." That is, the symmetry of residential

preferences for in-group enclaves on the part of both hosts and migrants reinforce each other as a core cause of segregation, a dynamic that echoes the "discriminatory equilibrium" identified by Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2016, 14) wherein "both Muslim immigrants and rooted French act negatively toward each other, and this is mutually reinforcing." The narrative in turn enables a particular type of politics. If migrants prefer enclaves, then the lack of residential segregation may not be a problem to be fixed, or, more ominously, is a problem that can only be fixed through force. To the extent that this understanding of migrant preferences is correct or incorrect, generalizable or context-specific, thus has broad political significance.

2 Theoretical Motivations

Scholars and policymakers have long viewed segregation as a key determinant of social inequality that shapes intergroup relations and broader social cohesion and economic mobility (Myrdal, 1944; Massey, 1987; Massey and Denton, 2012). Studies on randomly distributed housing vouchers find causal effects of moving children out of impoverished neighborhoods on important outcomes in adulthood including higher incomes and chances of attending university as well as lower likelihoods of living in an impoverished area and raising a child without a father present (among women) (Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016). Researchers argue that segregation impedes migrant acquisition of the host country language and adoption of the host community's norms (Damm and Rosholm, 2010), even if it might have positive economic impacts for migrants (Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund, 2003; Martén, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2019).

A large literature spanning nearly a century, focused largely on racial dynamics in the United States, has identified multiple root causes for segregation including restrictive laws, market supply, discrimination in the housing market, differential patterns of mobility across

groups, and preferences. We focus here on the last of these, preferences, i.e. desires to live amongst co-ethnics in homogeneous enclaves. Preferences have figured centrally in the American literature on causes of segregation and have also emerged as a key topic in studies of migrant segregation in Europe. They underlie or interact with many other causes of segregation. For example, restrictive laws and gate-keeping by discriminatory housing market actors likely reflect, at least in part, host population preferences to police boundaries between themselves and incoming groups. Preferences are also important in their own right. Even where supply-side factors fully constrain housing choices, a situation that seems uncommon, preferences likely motivate other relevant behaviors, like how to interact with neighbors or support for immigration policies.

The segregation literature differentiates between host preferences for segregation, on the one hand, and migrant preferences for segregation on the other. On the host side, research on white populations in the US ("hosts" in this context), documents substantial resistance to residential integration by Black ("migrant") populations, and explores multiple mechanisms for this resistance, including in-group preferences and out-group prejudice (Farley et al., 1994; Bobo and Zubrinsky, 1996; Emerson, Yancey and Chai, 2001; Swaroop and Krysan, 2011; Clark, 2002, 2009; Charles, 2000). Studies of immigrant inclusion in Europe add to this list concerns about cultural dissonance, purity, and misunderstanding (Adida, Laitin and Valfort, 2016; Spicer, 2008). Regardless of specific mechanisms, the general prediction is the same: host/white populations dislike neighborhoods with high migrant/Black concentrations and leave or avoid them when possible (also called "white flight" and "white avoidance.") Additional theories associated with Schelling (Schelling, 1971; Clark, 1991) specify further that these preferences may be non-linear, where small increases in the concentrations of migrants within neighborhoods induce large negative movements out of them by host citizens.

While theoretical expectations about hosts uniformly posit that hosts prefer segregation, theoretical expectations about migrant preferences diverge. Spatial assimilation theory, the

primary approach, assumes that migrants ultimately wish to assimilate into host society and view residential integration as a key pathway for doing so. Over time, as migrants gain socioeconomic status and cultural knowledge and skills, the theory predicts that they will move out of migrant enclaves and into host communities (Massey, 1985; Massey and Denton, 1985).[1] In contrast to spatial assimilation theory, the ethnic enclave model (Zhou and Logan, 1991) emphasizes positive features for migrants living in migrant heavy communities including expectations of mutual assistance from their in-group; a greater sense of welcome and safety within their in-group; and enmeshment within in-group networks. Scholars studying European migrant communities particularly emphasize cultural features and the help fellow migrants can provide in navigating a new society (Spicer, 2008). According to this theory, even if barriers to movement are removed by rising income and socioeconomic status, *migrants will stay in the migrant neighborhood.*

Reflecting political controversies and tensions surrounding recent migration in Europe, a growing empirical literature applies and evaluates American theories in the European context, focusing particularly on the role of host and migrant preferences and whether segregation is driven by host desires to avoid migrants, migrant desires to live in enclaves, or both. These studies largely rely on administrative tracking data or large government surveys to examine movement into and out of neighborhoods depending on neighborhood demographic composition. They control for neighborhood features like income level and unemployment, housing market features (where possible), and individual characteristics such as age, income, education, household structure, national origin, and employment status. Some exploit natural experiments generated by refugee initial placement policies in countries like Sweden and Denmark that disperse refugees across regions and towns (Åslund, 2005; Damm, 2009;

[1] An alternative theory, spatial stratification theory (Logan and Alba, 1993; South and Crowder, 1998) suggests that migrants wish to move out of enclaves but cannot do so because of barriers created by hosts; it posits the same belief about migrant preferences as spatial assimilation theory but differs on whether migrants are able to act on these preferences.

Bratsberg et al., 2021).

These studies find that European populations generally leave neighborhoods when migrants move in, confirming "white flight" and "white avoidance" dynamics (Andersson, 2013; Andersson, Berg and Dahlberg, 2021; Schaake, Burgers and Mulder, 2010; Bolt, Van Kempen and Van Ham, 2008). This pattern is strongest for host populations with mobility options, e.g., those who own rather than rent their home (Andersson, Berg and Dahlberg, 2021) or when market conditions are favorable (Winke, 2018). It is also strongest when incoming populations are more culturally dissimilar (e.g., those from non-European origin countries). The pattern holds even when socioeconomic controls are used in models, suggesting it does not merely reflect class factors.

The studies also reveal patterns of migrant movement that seem to contradict spatial assimilation theory. Refugees leave initial placements that are not heavily migrant (Damm, 2009; Åslund, 2005). Once in migrant enclaves, they tend to stay, and this is true even for relatively wealthy migrants who have the economic means to move to a wider range of neighborhoods (Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013; Schaake, Burgers and Mulder, 2010). When migrants move, they tend to move within neighborhoods or to other migrant enclaves rather than to non-migrant areas (Åslund, 2005; Bolt, Van Kempen and Van Ham, 2008; Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013; Boschman and Van Ham, 2015; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008; Anderson, 2008). Researchers thus conclude that spatial assimilation theory may have limited relevance in Europe as migrants prefer to stay in migrant enclaves rather than seek residential integration. As Bolt, Van Kempen and Van Ham (2008) write: "Even when we take all kinds of individual variables into account, minority groups still end up in a concentration neighbourhood much more often than the indigenous groups. This result contradicts one of the hypotheses of the spatial assimilation model."

Taken as a whole, the European findings suggest a reinforcing and symmetric logic of host and migrant preferences that together generate segregation in that context. In other words,

(dis)integration is a two-way process (Klarenbeek, 2021). Hosts exit and avoid migrant heavy communities; migrants, in turn, prefer to stay in these communities even when they can leave. This suggests a "discriminatory equilibrium" wherein both hosts and migrants act in ways that ultimately prevent integration (Adida, Laitin and Valfort, 2016). Furthermore, it enables a political narrative wherein migrants are held at least partially responsible for the failures of their own assimilation into European society (Søholt and Lynnebakke, 2015).

Despite these apparently robust European patterns and the strength of the empirical research on which they are built, there are limitations to the inferences we can make about preferences from records of residential movement. Preferences are often a "residual" explanation, that is, what is left over after other factors, typically socioeconomic ones, have been ruled out (Boschman and Van Ham, 2015). But other explanations exist, of course, as most studies readily acknowledge.

First, migrants may stay in migrant neighborhoods not because they like co-ethnics or migrants, but because they feel unwelcome or unsafe in host communities (Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013). Spicer (2008) finds that, for migrants placed in low-income white neighborhoods, "Such neighbourhoods were constructed as places in which social exclusion was experienced in a number of interconnected ways: hostility and racist harassment, limited resources, few inclusive local services and limited opportunities to develop supportive social bonds and bridges." Similarly, Kuhn and Maxwell (2023) find that migrants feel greater "psychological integration" in migrant dense communities.

Second, in a dynamic known as the "racial proxy hypothesis" in the American literature on segregation, migrants may stay in migrant neighborhoods due to other features found in those neighborhoods that correlate with migrant density, not the presence of co-ethnics per se (Bosch, 2008). In the European context, Muslim migrants might prefer to live near mosques, which frequently are found in neighborhoods with many Muslims, which in turn also often have many migrants. If (Muslim) migrants stay in these communities, is it because they

want to live near migrants or because they want to live near a mosque? In another example, Spicer (2008) notes that teachers in migrant heavy schools may be more equipped to deal with students from different backgrounds and varying degrees of language skills. Parents may prefer schools in migrant-dominant neighborhoods, not because they are migrant-dominant, but because they offer the best teachers for their assimilating children.

Aggregate movement patterns cannot easily parse these alternative causal channels, suggesting the need for additional empirical lenses. Of note, ethnographic studies measuring preferences more directly, by asking migrants what they desire, suggest that "preferences for segregation" may not be the norm everywhere. In a study of migrants in Oslo, for example, Søholt and Lynnebakke (2015) find that migrants express the desire to live in mixed communities where they have the opportunity to interact with native Norwegians, not ethnic enclaves. These studies highlight the possibility that migrants may not universally prefer segregation. They also indicate the value of complementing administrative record data with other measures of preferences like interviews and surveys and expanding the scope of analysis beyond a handful of European cases. Our study is an attempt to address the shortcomings of previous work by implementing a survey-based conjoint experiment measuring preferences for segregation in a non-European setting, i.e. Turkey.

3 The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey

This study explores social dynamics between Turkish locals as the primary host population and Syrian refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War, a significant cause of displacement in the 21st century. With the implementation of an open-border policy by the ruling AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) government at the onset of the conflict as well as subsequent European Union (EU) externalization policies and deals implemented in response to the European "migrant crisis" (Arar, 2017; Mourad and Norman, 2020), Turkey became a refuge

for approximately 3.2 million Syrian refugees. Turkey thus hosts more Syrians than any other country, exceeding the top European host (Germany) more than 3 fold (UNHCR, 2024).

Our study takes place more than a decade into the Syrian refugee crisis, after the acute stage eased and the hard work of integration began. Syrians remain the largest displaced group in the world. Devictor and Do (2017) find that refugees spend on average 11 years in exile, although this number increases to 21 years in protracted situations like that of Syrians.[2] Indeed most Syrians living in Turkey are unable to return home due to continued fears of persecution, oppression, and threats to their lives (Watch, 2023). Given that resettlement is a possibility for only 1 percent of refugees (UNHCR, n.d.), integration into Turkey is the only option for many Syrians living in the country. Only around 240,000 of thse Syrians have been offered citizenship by the Turkish government to date (multeciler.org.tr, 2023).

The prolonged coexistence of Syrian refugees with Turkish citizens has had diverse social and political consequences. The initially welcoming response from the Turkish population at the start of the war gradually eroded, giving way to growing apathy and weariness towards the refugees. Lazarev and Sharma (2017*a*) found a positive impact of religious influences on attitudes towards Syrians at the war's start, but this pro-refugee sentiment waned as a focus on differences in religious practices grew (Alakoc, Goksel and Zarychta, 2022) and economic burdens became apparent (Fahim, 2022). Getmansky, Sınmazdemir and Zeitzoff (2018) found common perceptions of refugees posing a security threat. The extended stay of Syrian refugees in Turkey has sparked widespread public critique and vitriol regarding immigration policies (Şahin Mencütek et al., 2023; Alakoc, Goksel and Zarychta, 2022). These debates are driven by a complex interplay of economic, social, and security factors. In recent years, inter-communal violence and refoulement (sending refugees back to their country of origin) have been increasing (Human Rights Watch, 2022*a*; International Crisis

[2]Protracted situations are defined as those in which refugees have already spent 5 years in exile or longer.

Group, 2018).

Syrians in Turkey join an already complex society with a deep Kurd/Turk division. Kurds constitute Turkey's largest ethnic minority, widely estimated at 15–20 percent of the total population (White, 2000; Gunes, 2012). Historically concentrated in the southeast, they have long endured legal and political restrictions on their language and identity (van Bruinessen, 1992). Although limited reforms in the early 2000s relaxed some constraints, tensions persist. Decades-long conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, designated as a terrorist group by the US, the EU, and Turkey) has shaped Kurdish activism and state responses (Romano, 2006).

3.0.1 Research Site: Adana

Our study is concentrated in the secondary city of Adana in Southwest Turkey.[3] Originally home to many Armenians, Adana was one of Turkey's earliest industrial cities (Akçalı, 2023). Today it has a population of 1.76 million, making it the fifth most populous city in Turkey. Located about 100km from the Syrian border, it has been a major recipient of Syrian refugees, most of whom came from the city of Aleppo. Indeed, some of Adana's more Syrian dense areas are known as "Little Aleppo" (Akçalı, 2023). In 2023, when we fielded this study, Syrians in Adana numbered around 239,660,[4] about 14 percent of the city's total population. Over 98 percent of Syrians in Turkey live intermixed with the local population, outside of camps, in ordinary neighborhoods (World Bank, 2021), and Adana is no different. Syrians have settled throughout the city, particularly in the South and West, in areas traditionally populated by Turkish internal migrants.

[3]This study is embedded in a larger project seeking to understand integration into secondary cities in Sweden, Turkey, and Jordan. Secondary cities provide good places to study integration and processes of residential segregation because they are typically less diverse and less transient compared to metropoles like Istanbul and Ankara.

[4]"Number of Syrians in Turkey July 2023," Refugees Association. Accessed 29 Jan 2024. https://multeciler.org.tr/eng/number-of-syrians-in-turkey/.

3.0.2 Syrian Housing and Residential Mobility in Turkey

Turkey does not have a clear housing policy for Syrian refugees (Güngördü and Kahraman, 2021), which forces them to rely on the private housing market. Syrians in Turkey typically compete with internal (rural to urban) migrants and Kurds for affordable housing (Akçalı, 2023). This situation often fuels local dissatisfaction and likely worsens attitudes toward Syrians (Erden and Özçürümez, 2024). Kurfalı and Özçürümez (2023)'s research indicates that 80% of homeowners prefer renting to civil servants due to their stable income, effectively excluding Syrians, who cannot work in the public sector. Additionally, homeowners require a Turkish guarantor or co-signer, even when the property will be occupied by Syrians. Homeowners also express concern that Syrians may leave without paying rent or utilities, given their temporary status in Turkey. Moreover, both locals and Syrians are asked to provide proof of steady income; while locals can often meet this requirement, Syrians typically cannot. These barriers create challenges that induce Syrians to rely more heavily on their own community to find and secure housing (Kurfalı and Özçürümez, 2023), which may in turn fuel segregation. As a result, many Syrians live in less integrated, peripheral neighborhoods or informal settlements, further isolating them from the broader community.

Although restricted from free movement between provinces beginning in 2019, Syrians have been largely free to move at will within the cities of their residency permits. In 2022, the Turkish government revised its policy, introducing restrictions that barred foreigners from applying for residency permits in neighborhoods where at least 25 percent of the population was composed of non-citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2022*b*). As officially stated on May 16, 2022: "Considering the foreign population density in various regions of our country, the Ministry has closed the registration of temporary protection, international protection, residence permits, and residence changes for foreigners under temporary or international protection in 781 neighborhoods across certain provinces, except for newborns and nuclear family reunification" (Presidency of Migration Management, 2022a). As of July 1, 2022, the

threshold is reduced to 20% (Human Rights Watch, 2022*b*), a total of 1,169 neighborhoods (in 63 out of 81 provinces/cities) have been closed to new foreign registrations (Presidency of Migration Management, 2022b).[5]

Figure 1 the shows the percentage of neighborhoods in each province/city that are restricted. Most cities had a least a few restricted neighborhoods. Adana is shown in pink. Just under 10% (75) of Adana's neighborhoods were affected, placing it as a slightly above average city in terms of restrictions on freedom of Syrian residential movements.

The policy was around a year old when we conducted our study. It was unclear to us whether and how it was being enforced. It was also unclear how many people in Adana knew about it.[6] As we will discuss in the design section, we took steps to ensure that the policy would not unduly impact our experiment.

[5]Turkey has 81 (provinces/cities), which serve as the highest-level administrative divisions. Mayors at the city level are elected in metropolitan municipalities (büyükşehir) but not in smaller cities where governance is centered at the district level. Each city consists of multiple districts. Each district (ilçe) within a city has its own elected district mayor (ilçe belediye başkanı). Neighborhoods (Mahalle) are the smallest administrative units. While election results are recorded at the neighborhood level (e.g., how many votes were cast from each neighborhood), they are not independent electoral units. Instead, they are part of a district, and election outcomes determine representatives at the district or city level.

[6]It was mentioned by some Syrians we interviewed, but it seemed more hypothetical than concrete.

Figure 1: % of Neighborhoods Restricted to Foreigners Across Turkish Cities



4 Hypotheses

We explore three hypotheses about preferences for segregation in this paper.[7] We explain the hypotheses below with some additional information on motivations for them, where not explicitly clear from the review of literature above. The wording below is almost the same as what was pre-registered with slight variations for clarity (the exact wording is provided in the appendix).

Hypothesis 1. Members of both host and migrant groups will respond to neighborhood demographics, preferring to live in communities with higher proportions of their ingroup and lower proportions of the outgroup.

Hypothesis 1a. The Schelling (1971) threshold effect hypothesis: there will be a non-linear relationship between increases in percent out-group and decreases in desire to live in the neighborhood. (Thus, small shifts in the percent of outgroup members will not have noticeable effects when the outgroup is small, but beyond a certain threshold there will be a large

[7]We pre-registered 5 primary hypotheses. In the interest of brevity, we only analyze three here.

negative reaction to percent of outgroup).

Hypothesis 2. Demographic context will have a larger impact on the host group's desire to move to the neighborhood versus migrant group. That is, that there will be an asymmetry in responses to neighborhood demographic context and in-group/out-group sizes. We base this on the expectations of Spatial Assimilation Theory, which holds that migrants seek to integrate into host society to capture the benefits of contact with host members, whereas the host group seeks to preserve local homogeneity and reinforce boundaries with migrant group to maintain status.

Hypothesis 2a. The threshold or "tipping point" for refusing to move to the neighborhood will be lower for host group versus migrant group members.

Hypothesis 3. Syrians, as the more vulnerable group due to recent experience with insecurity and displacement, will have greater sensitivity to neighborhood non-demographic characteristics than Turks. This is true for positive neighborhood characteristics (services and social capital) and negative ones (crimes).[8] Furthermore, as noted above, Turks will be more concerned with percent of outgroup in the neighborhood.

Hypothesis 3a. Worse crime will have a larger effect for Syrians compared to Turks.

Hypothesis 3b. Lower social capital among neighbors will have a larger effect for Syrians compared to Turks.

Hypothesis 3c. High quality social services will have a larger effect for Syrians compared to Turks.

[8]Note that in our pre-registered plan we also had hypotheses on social disorder and Kurd versus Syrian outgroups. We analyze hypotheses in separate papers.

5 Research Design

We focus on one factor among many that shape patterns of residential segregation and integration: individual preferences for living in neighborhoods with in- versus out- group members. We explore these preferences via a conjoint survey experiment embedded in a door-to-door survey administered in Adana, Turkey in June-August 2023 (n=5,514, approximately evenly split between Turkish hosts and Syrian migrants).

5.1 Sample

For the Turkish population, we implemented a standard probability proportionate to size (PPS) sampling strategy using Turkish Statistical Institute address-based population registration data. For Syrian refugees, the process was more complicated. The General Directorate of Migration Management does not share address information for the Syrian population (estimated to be 243,496). Therefore, there is no definite data on how many people live in which district. However, local authorities, *muhtars* (heads of villages/neighborhoods), and NGOs in the region have knowledge about the geographic distribution of the population and the neighborhoods where it tends to be clustered. We relied on the expert opinions of these individuals to estimate the size of the Syrian population in different districts of the city, and stratified based on these estimates. Field supervisors randomized street and door numbers for household cluster starting points. Remaining household selections were made by skipping 3 houses until add up to 30 households in each cluster.

Figure 1 displays the location of respondents across Adana (white dots are are Syrians, red dots Turks). Our sample was drawn from areas throughout the city. Some neighborhoods are predominantly Turkish (especially in the northern, wealthier parts of the city). Others are predominantly Syrian (especially in the south and west). And some neighborhoods are mixtures of both populations. These distributions broadly conform with our knowledge of

the city.[9]

Figure 2: Map of Respondents



Note: Fuzzy geolocations of respondents. White are Syrians and Red are Turks.

[9]One of the study sites in Akçalı (2023)'s study of "Little Aleppo" was Kocavezir, which is near the cluster of white dots just east of the airport on the map.

Based on the geographic clustering of coordinates exhibited in the map, we calculate a measure of neighborhood diversity for immediate neighborhoods (within 500 meters of the respondent) and broader neighborhoods (within 2km of the respondent). Figure A4 displays the average proportion of Syrians living in the immediate and broader neighborhood of the respondent. It reveals that Syrians in our sample tend to live near other Syrians (75% of their immediate neighborhood is Syrian), while Turks tend not to live near Syrians in their immediate neighborhood (25% Syrian). But neighborhoods are far from perfectly segregated, especially at the wider level.

Figure 3: Proportions of Syrians living in the immediate and wider neighborhood of Syrian, Turkish, and all respondents

Population	Neighborhood	Mean	Median	Min	Max	SD
All respondents	Immediate neighborhood	0.498	0.519	0.000	1.000	0.333
Syrians	Immediate neighborhood	0.725	0.780	0.025	1.000	0.231
Turks	Immediate neighborhood	0.270	0.200	0.000	0.882	0.254
All respondents	Wider neighborhood	0.510	0.591	0.000	1.000	0.245
Syrians	Wider neighborhood	0.640	0.663	0.016	1.000	0.180
Turks	Wider neighborhood	0.379	0.375	0.000	0.754	0.230

Table 1 presents demographics and other features of our sample. We achieved the desired balance of respondents born in Syria (48%) and Turkey (52%).[10] Our sample skewed male and young. Very few respondents had more than a secondary school degree and most (82%) reported difficulties or great difficulties covering needs. The Syrian sample was younger, more male, and had fewer people with a secondary education or higher compared to the Turkish sample. More Syrians than Turks reported significant economic hardship. As expected, Turks in the sample had lived in Adana longer (41 years) than Syrians (8 years).

[10]Only 1.6% (n=42) of our born-in-Syria sample has citizenship, and just .5% (n=13) of the born-in-Turkey sample **do not** have citizenship. About 3% (n=178) of our sample identifies as Kurdish as one of their identities. This percentage is lower than the population estimate of 18%, which is not surprising as our design focused on achieving a balanced sample of Syrians and Turks and we did not attempt to sample from Kurd heavy neighborhoods.

Table 1: Survey Sample Demographics

Demographic	**Turks**	**Syrians**
Years in Adana (mean) (98% of the Turkish sample lived in Adana their whole life.)	41 years	8 years
Observations	2,861	2,501
Male (%)	53	59
Female (%)	47	41
Observations	2,862	2,728
18–30 (%)	27	33
31 to 40 Years (%)	23	33
41 to 50 Years (%)	23	20
51 to 60 Years (%)	16	10
61 Years + (%)	10	4
Observations	2,862	2,725
Less Than Primary School (%)	5	15
Primary Education (%)	34	35
Middle School Education (%)	12	33
Secondary Education (%)	34	10
Two-Year Degree/Community College (%)	4	2
University Degree or Higher(%)	10	4
Observations	2,858	2,718
Can Save Income (%)	3	3
Income Covers Needs (%)	26	4
Difficulties Covering Needs (%)	58	24
Great Difficulties Covering Needs (%)	14	70
Observations	2,853	2,711

5.2 Ethics

Members of the research team visited Adana in June of 2023. During that time, we carried out approximately 35 in-depth interviews lasting about an hour each with Turks and Syrians. We also worked intensively with a local partner on the ground, Frekans Research, to ensure our protocols and questionnaires were safe and locally appropriate. Team members returned to Adana during the training and administration of the face-to-face survey. Informed consent in line with EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) protocols as well as local ethics board approval from Koç University was obtained orally before any interviews were carried out. Respondents were informed about the purpose of the survey, that their response would be anonymized, and that their participation was voluntary without any penalty for refusing participation at any time during the interview. Respondents were given the opportunity to ask questions before giving their consent to participate. Deception was not employed in the experiment and all scenarios were introduced as hypothetical.

5.3 Experimental Design

We use a single-profile conjoint experimental design to explore how different neighborhood attributes shape preferences about where to live. Conjoint experiments manipulate multiple attributes in a hypothetical scenario, with the levels of each attribute randomly assigned. They are ideal for interrogating complex questions like segregation where many factors are expected to simultaneously drive preferences (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Moreover, these designs can mitigate social desirability bias by bundling together multiple features, allowing respondents to conceal controversial preferences (Bansak et al., 2021).

Each respondent in our experiment evaluated three hypothetical neighborhoods, which enumerators read out loud, pausing frequently to repeat descriptions and ensure respondents

could follow the description.[11] The experiment manipulated six neighborhood attributes: demographic profile; income level (lower than or similar to the respondent); crime level (no problem with crime, occasional problems with crime, frequent problems with crime); quality of public services (poor, high); religiosity (most neighbors are: not religious, religious, devoutly religious); and social capital (low, high). See Table 2 for attributes and levels.

The core attribute of interest is neighborhood demographic profile, which we operationalize as the percentage of the neighborhood that is Turkish, Syrian, and Kurdish.[12] We primarily distinguish Turkish and Syrian respondents by reported place of birth. At times, we further differentiate Kurds from Turks based on reported identity among respondents born in Turkey. This is a fully factorialized experiment without any restrictions on the combinations of arms a participant could see.

[11] Because the experiment was delivered verbally rather than on a screen, we chose a single profile ratings-based design over a forced choice to reduce complexity.

[12] For the demographic attributes (percent Turkish, percent Syrian, and percent Kurdish), percentages were bound to add up to 100, with a lower bound of 10 percent and upper bound of 80 percent for each group, and increments of 10. Randomization for the Turkish percentage was completed first, with a uniform probability of being assigned to each decile. The remaining population was then randomly split between Syrian and Kurd. Thus, if the neighborhood was randomly assigned to be 70 percent Turkish, the remaining population of 30 percent was randomly split (in increments of 10) between Syrians and Kurds (either 20 percent Syrian and 10 percent Kurd, or 20 percent Kurd and 10 percent Syrian). This randomization procedure, which was necessitated by the need for neighborhood demographics to add up to 100, resulted in a skew in neighborhood demographics to Turkish dominant neighborhoods. That is, it produced more neighborhoods where Turks were the majority groups than either of the other groups. As a result, Turkish respondents were more likely to see own group dominant neighborhoods than Syrians were. We account for this by including group fixed effects in pooled models or estimating models separately for each group. We also note that this skew is representative of actual Adana neighborhoods, which are more commonly Turkish dominant than either Syrian or Kurd dominant.

Table 2: Randomized Attributes

No.	Dimension	Arms
1	**Income**	-lower than -the same as
2	**Turkish**	-Number [10 to 80%] bounded to equal 100 with arms 3 and 4
3	**Syrian**	-Number [10 to 80%] bounded to equal 100 with arms 2 and 4
4	**Kurdish**	-Number [10 to 80%] bounded to equal 100 with arms 2 and 3
5	**Crime**	-no -occasional -frequent
6	**Services**	-poor -high
7	**Devout**	-many -few
8	**Social Capital**	-know one another personally and help one another out often -keep to themselves and tend not to engage with one another

Our design has similarities with the Farley-Schuman showcard methodology, used widely in survey based studies of preferences for segregation in the United States. The Farley-Schuman showcard methodology involves showing a card to respondents with stylized representation of a neighborhood as a set of houses (Farley et al., 1978; Charles, 2000; Swaroop and Krysan, 2011). Showcards range from all white houses, to all Black houses, with increments in between, and are a way of simplifying information about the demographic breakdown of a neighborhood. Interviewers show respondents the set of cards and ask which neighborhood they would most prefer to live in, or, in some cases, which ones they would absolutely not live in (Swaroop and Krysan, 2011). Unlike our experiment, the Farley-Schuman methodology does not involve randomized treatments (all respondents are shown all neighborhoods) and it usually does not present additional information about the neighborhood.

5.3.1 Experimental Prompt

Our experiment began with an introductory prompt to define the concept of neighborhood and prepare participants for the experiment. After the introductory prompt, interviewers

read a description of a neighborhood, shown below with experimental arms bolded in brackets.

Experimental Prompt:

I would like to talk to you next about neighborhoods. A neighborhood is the area around a house, that is, the nearby streets, houses, and people living within a kilometer or so distance. A city like Adana has many different neighborhoods. I would like to read to you some descriptions of hypothetical neighborhoods here in Adana. I would like you to please consider each neighborhood carefully and answer some questions about it. I will ask you to do this three times, for three different neighborhoods.

Most people in the neighborhood have incomes **[lower than/ about the same as]** yours. About **[10-80]** percent of the households in this neighborhood are Turkish. (Arm increases by increments of 10.) Another **[10-80]** percent of the households in this neighborhood are Syrian. (Arm increases by increments of 10.) The last **[10-80]** percent of the households in this neighborhood are Kurdish. (Arm increases by increments of 10.)

The neighborhood has **[no/ occasional/ frequent]** problems with crime.

Public services like trash collection, road maintenance, and schooling are **[of poor/ of high]** quality in this neighborhood.

[Many/ few] people in this neighborhood are religiously devout and pray frequently.

Residents of this neighborhood **[know one another personally and help one another out often/ keep to themselves and tend not to engage with one another]**.

5.3.2 Primary and Secondary Outcomes

The primary dependent variable is a measure of how likely the respondent would be to move to the neighborhood. The measure, which comes directly after the experimental treatment, asks the respondent to "consider a situation where you can no longer stay in your current

neighborhood and must find a new place to live very soon. If you found suitable and affordable housing in this new neighborhood that I just described, and you are able to move here, how likely would you be to move to it?" The response is a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 meaning no chance at all, and 10 meaning they definitely would move there. We isolate preferences from considerations of cost and supply by explicitly stating that the respondent can "no longer stay" in their current neighborhood (and therefore a move is necessary) and that they found "suitable and affordable" housing in the new hypothetical neighborhood. We also attempted to neutralize the effect of the new government policy, announced about a year prior to the experiment, that foreigners would not be allowed to move to a set of immigrant dense neighborhoods, by specifying that the respondent is "able to move" to the neighborhood.

In addition to the primary measure (move to neighborhood), we measure secondary outcomes related to perceptions of safety, being welcomed into the community, and likelihood of being helped by neighbors. These secondary outcomes allow us to probe mechanisms underlying preferences. To further evaluate preferences in a way that is less connected to real estate market factors or restrictions on residences, we ask whether respondents would be willing to visit the neighborhood to eat in a restaurant or visit a shop. We expect the effect of the neighborhood demographic profile to be similar across outcomes.

5.3.3 Experimental Realism

The experiment asked respondents to consider choices that were largely within their realm of experience. Evaluation of neighborhoods is something that many people in Turkey, including Syrians, do, or contemplate doing, with some regularity. Residential mobility within Turkey is generally high. Wasti and Çetin Önder (2023) note that 2.5 million people migrate within Turkey every year; in 2021, around 3.3 percent of the population moved between provinces. This does not count movement within provinces and therefore is a conservative estimate of overall mobility. It also does not provide a breakdown for Syrians and Turks.

We did not ask respondents how often they moved in the past, but we did ask about satisfaction with their current neighborhoods, which provides an indicator of interest in moving. Figure 4 shows distributions of satisfaction with one's current neighborhood for Syrians and Turks. We see that substantial numbers of both groups are less than perfectly satisfied with their existing neighborhoods. We also see that Syrians generally express less satisfaction than Turks, with a minority of Syrians quite unhappy. This would suggest that members of both groups might be willing to move, with Syrians having a higher baseline level of willingness to move than Turks.

Figure 4: Distributions of Satisfaction with Current Neighborhood, by Country of Birth



The experimental neighborhoods generally represent the types of neighborhoods in which our respondents reported living. In Figure 5, we present the proportions of perceived outgroup neighbor proportions versus those we showed in our experimental vignettes across Turkish and Syrian-born respondents. Perceived outgroup proportions are based on respondent reports of the demographic breakdown of their own neighborhoods. The experiment appears to mirror perceptions of actual respondent neighborhoods to a large extent.[13] More importantly, the neighborhoods we show in the experiment are neighborhoods that respondents report as real neighborhoods they live in. While we cannot validate survey responses against administrative population data due to information constraints, we note that the map of respondents shown earlier suggests a wide variety of different neighborhood distributions that concur with the distribution of perceived neighborhoods in Figure 5.

[13]There are some exceptions: Syrian respondents perceive more Syrian dominant neighborhoods than we show in the experiment. Further, the distribution of perceived Turkish population sizes follows a normal distribution rather than the uniform distribution in the experiment, so Turkish respondents saw extreme hypotheticals (both Syrian dominant and Turk dominant) more frequently than they report in real life.

Figure 5: Distributions of Perceived Outgroup Percentages in Neighborhoods and Vignette Outgroup Percentages, by Country of Birth



6 Estimation

Baseline models estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs) for each attribute. We estimate demographic effects two ways. In a more concise formulation, we estimate a single percent out-group attribute (for Syrians, percent Turk; for Turks, percent Syrian). In a more extended model, we estimate decile dummies for size of outgroup (20% through 90%). In these models, we also control for percent Kurd and, in models that pool Turk and Syrian

respondents, the respondent's ingroup. For binary attributes, we use as baselines: no crime; low social capital; poorer; low quality services; and low religiosity. The models are therefore run such that we expect estimated attributes to have a negative effect on probability of moving to the neighborhood.

In line with standard approaches to conjoint experiments, we run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) show that OLS is a consistent estimator of the AMCE. We analyze the effects of our experimental manipulations on our outcomes and mechanisms using the equation presented below in which coefficient vectors $\beta_1, \beta_2...$ are each of length k-1, k is the total number of arms within a dimension, i denotes the respondent, and j denotes which round of three rounds each respondent completes.

Model Equation:

$$Y = \beta_{0ij} + \beta_1 Income_{ij} + \beta_2 Outgroup_{ij} + \beta_3 Kurdish_{ij} + \beta_4 Crime_{ij} + \beta_5 Services_{ij} + \beta_6 Devout_{ij} + \beta_7 SocialCapital_{ij} + \beta_8 Controls_i + \varepsilon$$

We also run heterogeneous effects analyses across migrants and host community membership to examine differences across these groups. We test for the equality of coefficients between host and migrant community members by interacting the treatment variables of each experiment with an indicator for whether or not the respondent was born in Turkey.

We implement robust standard errors clustered at the level of the respondent to account for within-respondent correlation across the rounds. The error term ε_{ijk} refers to any random variation and, importantly, the effects of any additional determinants of preferences for a neighborhood or a neighbor not accounted for in the model. We will run robustness checks of our findings using marginal means analysis (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley, 2020) (right now we simply run marginal means in Stata) and accounting for the round in which the profile was seen.

7 Results

7.1 Main Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 expects that members of both host (Turk) and migrant (Syrian) groups will prefer to live in communities with higher proportions of their own group. To evaluate, we use the single percent outgroup variable. We expect a negative relationship between desire to move to the neighborhood and percent outgroup. We analyze Hypothesis 1a, concerning the linearity of the relationship between group size and preferences, using the extended outgroup variable and estimating separate effects for each decile of the outgroup.

We find strong support for Hypothesis 1. (See SI materials Table A1 for full results). The estimated coefficient on the percent outgroup in the pooled sample is -.0418, significant at the .001 level. This implies that a 25 percentage point increase in the size of the outgroup reduces the willingness to move to the neighborhood by 1 point (on a 10 point scale), where the mean outcome for this variable is 4.8. We also see evidence on non-linearity, consistent with Hypothesis 1a. Marginal effects are sharpest at lower levels of outgroup and progressively diminish beyond 50% outgroup.[14]

Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis anticipates that the negative AMCE for percent outgroup on willingness move to the neighborhood will be larger for host group (Turks) versus migrant group (Syrians). We also consider Hypothesis 2a, that the the threshold or "tipping point" for refusing to move to the neighborhood will be lower for host group versus migrant group members.

[14] In accordance with our pre-registered plan, we also ran an analysis using Stata's threshold package, which allows coefficients to differ across outgroup percentages, enabling us to observe abrupt breaks or asymmetries (thresholds) in effects. According to this analysis, two thresholds exist. Beyond 40% outgroup a threshold occurs indicating people are less willing to move to a neighborhood (4.42, $p<0.00$) compared to a threshold of 30% or lower outgroup (6.46, $p<0.00$) as well as a threshold of above 30% and up to 40% outgroup (5.37. $p<0.00$).

The data strongly confirm Hypotheses 2 and 2a. Indeed the difference between host (Turk) and migrant (Syrian) reaction to demographic context is quite stark. Turks on the whole are less willing to move than Syrians (as anticipated by our analysis of satisfaction rates)[15] and, more to the point, respond strongly and negatively to increasing outgroup size. Treating outgroup percent as a continuous variable, Turks react sharply to outgroup size (-0.066, $p<0.001$), whereas Syrians do not respond at all (-0.001, $p>.100$). The interaction between the continuous outgroup percent and group is significant at the .001 level. (See SI materials Table A1). When we explore the relationship using decile dummies, we find significant interactions at the .001 level between group (Turk vs. Syrian) for all decile dummies.(See SI materials Table A3). As with the pooled sample, and consistent with Hypothesis 2a, we find non-linear responses for Turkish respondents to outgroup size, with big marginal increases at lower levels of group size.

Figure 6 illustrates these results, demonstrating how incremental increases in the percentage of outgroup affect willingness to move to a neighborhood for Turks to a significant degree in contrast to Syrians, for whom the effect of outgroup percentage remains null or close to null compared to a baseline of 20% outgroup. Note that, if Syrians were particularly anxious to avoid neighborhoods where Syrians exceed 20% of the Turkish population, that is, if they were concerned about compliance with the restricted neighborhood policy, then we would expect a large difference between 80% and 90% outgroup for Syrians. We do not see any evidence of this. A marginal means analysis shows in Figure 7 that while the willingness of Syrians to move to a neighborhood is centered at about 5 (on the 0 to 10 scale), with very little movement across demographic profiles. For Turks, in contrast, willingness is significantly different for each outgroup percentage threshold except at 80-90% where the effect converges.

These findings of asymmetric preferences for segregation provide an interesting and im-

[15]The mean outcome for our Turkish sample was 4.5 whereas it was 5.1 for Syrians.

portant counterpoint to the European literature on migrant segregation, which has found evidence that migrants appear to prefer to live in migrant enclaves. We find no corresponding evidence of preferences for segregation among the Syrian respondents in our Adana sample, although clearly the Turkish respondents in the sample, like their counterparts in Europe, do strongly prefer segregation.

Figure 6: AMCEs (top) of Outgroup % Thresholds on Likelihood of Moving to the Neighborhood, by country of birth



Note: OLS regression on subsamples by country of birth, n=8,521 for Turks and n=8,003 for Syrians. Point estimates are depicted as circles with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from standard errors clustered by respondent.

Figure 7: Marginal Means of Outgroup % Thresholds on Likelihood of Moving to the Neighborhood, by country of birth



Note: Marginal means for the interaction of birth country and outgroup percent of neighbors. Point estimates are depicted as in different shapes with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from standard errors clustered by respondent.

Thus far we have analyzed responses to percent outgroup, where this combines Syrians and Kurds (for Turks) and Turks and Kurds (for Syrians). In this paper, we are mostly concerned with Turkish response to Syrians (and vice versa).[16] We therefore reanalyzed the data to examine specific outgroups. Figure 8 shows the response of Turks to percent Syrian. (See also Table A4 in SI materials). It shows that Turks respond *even more sharply* to increasing Syrian percentage than to increasing outgroup percentage, with particularly strong reactions between 10 and 40% Syrian.[17]

Figure 8: AMCEs of Syrian% Thresholds on Likelihood of Moving to the Neighborhood Among Turks



Note: OLS regression on subsample of Turks, n=8,521. Point estimates are depicted as circles with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from robust standard errors clustered by respondent.

[16] We consider Kurds elsewhere in our work.
[17] Turks also respond negatively to percent Kurd, but not as strongly as they do to percent Syrian.

Hypothesis 3. The fourth hypothesis considers three non-demographic variables in the experiment: crime, quality of services, and social capital. It anticipates that Syrians, having recent experience with insecurity and displacement, will display greater sensitivity to neighborhood non-demographic characteristics than Turks.

Figure 9 demonstrates partial confirmation of Hypothesis 4. (See SI materials Table A1). Neighborhood crime has a larger impact on Syrian (shown as blue Xs) versus Turkish (shown as black circles) preferences, as expected, but the effects of social capital and service quality in the neighborhood are not significantly different for Turks and Syrians. Vertical, long-dashed lines are added to the figure to demarcate the effects of 40% and 50% of the outgroup in the neighborhood (vs. baseline of 20%) in black for Turks and blue for Syrians. These lines indicate that Turkish respondents react more negatively to a change from 20 to 50% Syrian than a change from no crime to frequent crime. In contrast, Syrian respondents display no reaction to demographic change but have a strong reaction to shifting crime levels. For crime then, Hypothesis 4 is well demonstrated.

Figure 9: AMCEs of Crime, Social Services, and Social Capital Among Neighbors on Likelihood of Moving to the Neighborhood Among Syrians versus Turks



Note: OLS regression on full sample, n=16,542. Point estimates are depicted as blue Xs (Syrians) and black circles (Turks) with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from standard errors clustered by respondent. The vertical black, long-dashed lines are at -1.43 and -2.21 marking the effects of 40% and 50% outgroup (baseline 20% outgroup), respectively, for Turks. The vertical blue, long-dashed lines are at -0.34 and -0.37 marking the effects of 40% and 50% outgroup, respectively, for Syrians (baseline 20% outgroup).

7.2 Robustness of Main Results

We conduct several robustness checks. First, we confirm balance across demographic covariates (see SI Materials Table A5). Second, we check for round effects and confirm that findings hold across the three rounds of the experiment, even when subset to Syrian and Turkish respondents (see SI Materials Table A6). Third, we consider various groups for whom the experiment might have been less realistic. In SI Material Table A7, we exclude respondents who responded that they were unlikely to move across three rounds (around 50 respondents). In SI Table A17, we drop respondents with extreme responses to the neighborhood satisfaction question (extremely dissatisfied and extremely satisfied). Results are robust across these models.

We then consider a more serious threat to inference: social desirability bias. It is plausible that Syrians in particular were reluctant to reveal their true preferences, in deference to the host group and their relatively precarious position in Turkey. Previous ethnographic work in Adana noted an unwillingness on the part of Syrians "to complain openly about the host country, neighborhood, and society," calling it "a sort of deference strategy" (Akçalı, 2023, 247). If so, this suggests an important underlying mechanism for our findings.

To evaluate the extent to which respondents might be concealing preferences we rely on two questions. The first, asked right after the experiment, queried the respondent on the extent to which they felt able to state true opinions about members of other groups in the survey. The second, which came at the end of the survey, asked respondents to report on the extent to which they could sincerely answer our questions. Both questions had a 0 to 10 scale, permitting respondents to reveal discomfort in fine gradations. SI Materials Figure A5 reveals that Turks had very little discomfort in answering our questions. Virtually all Turks answered "10" (could state true opinions; could answer questions sincerely). Syrians, in contrast, had more nuanced responses. On the one hand, few Syrians provided extreme answers (scores below 5) to either question. And close to 80% of Syrians responded with a

10 to the second question on sincere answers. On the other hand, around 40% of Syrians gave answers between 5 and 9 for the first question, suggesting many had some reluctance to state their true opinion about other groups.

To evaluate robustness of results to this reluctance, we first drop any respondent that answered 0 to either question. This drops only a handful of respondents and not surprisingly, there is little effect. We then drop any respondents with an average response to both questions below 7, which drops around 300 respondents. The results are again robust. (See SI Table A8). These findings give some confidence that our experimental results are not shaped by nervous respondents telling us what they they we (or their hosts) want to here. They do not, however, rule out a deeper story about deference that not only shapes survey sensitivities and responses but preferences themselves.

8 Explaining Asymmetry

Thus far, our results have shown a stark asymmetry in responses to neighborhood demographic context for Turkish vs. Syrian respondents. Turks react very strongly to increasing numbers of outgroup members (particularly Syrians); this demographic effect swamps the effects of other neighborhood attributes, including crime. In contrast, Syrians do not react at all to demographic context, but do respond significantly to crime levels (and, to a lesser extent, social capital and services). How can we explain these contrasting patterns?

8.1 Syrian Indifference to Neighborhood Demographics

One possible explanation for Syrian indifference to segregation has already been discussed: deference. Another possible explanation is that Syrians, knowledgable about the new policy restricting their entry into neighborhoods where they are already more than 25% of the population, rejected these neighborhoods. As discussed earlier, we do not think this is likely

given our design efforts to minimize cost and accessibility concerns and the lack of a different response by Syrians to 10% vs. 20% ingroup population deciles. However, we also consider an alternative dependent variable: willingness to visit the neighborhood. Results are shown in Figure A4 in the SI. While both groups are more likely to visit a neighborhood versus move to it, the neighborhood visit variable otherwise reproduces the pattern for the neighborhood choice variable: Turks respond sharply and clearly to size of outgroups; Syrians do not. These results strongly suggest that the core asymmetry we find in the paper in fact reflects preferences and not fears or beliefs about market cost or accessibility.

We next explore additional potential explanations by considering three alternative outcome variables: perceptions of safety; perceptions of welcome; and perceptions of help. We did not register hypotheses about these outcomes; hence this set of analyses should be treated as exploratory.

Table 3 shows results for the three alternative outcome variables. Across all outcomes, Turks respond more sharply to neighborhood demographics than Syrians. There are nonetheless important differences across outcomes in the nature of the asymmetry.

First, we consider the safety outcome. Here the asymmetry is very strong. On the one hand, Turks see their safety as strongly tied to percent outgroup. Even small upward shifts in outgroup size make them feel significantly less secure. Moreover, the outgroup effects are larger than the crime effects on safety for Turks. In contrast, Syrians do not tie their safety to demographic context at all. While this might be puzzling, interview data provide insights. Syrians saw safety in living near other Syrians; but they also saw safety in living near the host group because the host group had greater access to protection from the state. There is a sense in which bad things are less likely to happen in Turkish dominant spaces. A Syrian might experience discrimination in these places, but deeper forms of instability are perceived as less likely. Note this perception exists *even when we control for crime level in the experiment*, and it points to the deep (and real) sense in which Syrians have experienced

a level of insecurity that is only hypothetical to Turks.

The asymmetry is less marked for the other two outcomes. Once again, Turkish people respond very strongly to demographics which have a stronger impact than the experimental attribute indicating a high social capital neighborhood. The difference concerns Syrians. For feelings of welcome, and even more so, expectations of helpful neighbors, Syrians respond to neighborhood demographics like Turks, perceiving less welcome and less help as the percent outgroup increases. Syrians react less sharply than Turks (coefficients are smaller), but they nonetheless react (in contrast to the crime and move-to-neighborhood outcomes).

From these results, we advance a tentative explanation for our experimental findings of asymmetry and, especially, our finding that Syrians do not respond to neighborhood demographic context when evaluating willingness to move. Syrians place a high value on security, as evidenced by their strong response to neighborhood crime levels. However, unlike Turks, Syrians do not see living with their own group as necessarily providing greater security than living amongst hosts. This could reflect several factors. Syrians may see hosts as having greater protection from the state. This theme emerged in some interviews [expand]. It is also possible that Syrians view other Syrians as potentially posing threats to security – a perception that would perhaps not be unusual in a context of flight from civil war. In either case, Syrians do not see demographic context as providing clues about safety, and thus do not give it much weight in decisions. Turks, in contrast, see outgroup size as predictive of safety, welcome, and help, and hence react strongly to it.

Table 3: Outcomes of Feeling Safe, Welcomed, and Neighbors are Helpful Among Turks Versus Syrians

	Turks_Safe	Syrians_Safe	Turks_Welcome	Syrians_Welcome	Turks_Help	Syrians_Help
30% Outgroup	-0.3953***	-0.3168	-0.4016***	-0.3597	-0.3535***	-0.5358*
	(0.1071)	(0.2675)	(0.0963)	(0.2573)	(0.1066)	(0.2409)
40% Outgroup	-1.2353***	-0.1973	-1.3532***	-0.3391	-1.1149***	-0.6538**
	(0.1052)	(0.2448)	(0.0964)	(0.2414)	(0.1057)	(0.2278)
50% Outgroup	-1.8088***	-0.0928	-2.0329***	-0.2884	-1.8030***	-0.5376*
	(0.1106)	(0.2282)	(0.1031)	(0.2277)	(0.1095)	(0.2174)
60% Outgroup	-2.6198***	-0.1330	-2.9010***	-0.5238*	-2.5435***	-0.7298***
	(0.1143)	(0.2262)	(0.1071)	(0.2242)	(0.1130)	(0.2138)
70% Outgroup	-3.0792***	-0.1982	-3.4640***	-0.5155*	-3.0644***	-0.6772**
	(0.1113)	(0.2211)	(0.1073)	(0.2207)	(0.1134)	(0.2084)
80% Outgroup	-3.5862***	-0.1400	-3.9586***	-0.5286*	-3.5077***	-0.5933**
	(0.1150)	(0.2157)	(0.1129)	(0.2176)	(0.1174)	(0.2045)
90% Outgroup	-3.8018***	-0.1585	-4.2652***	-0.5017*	-3.7907***	-0.6352**
	(0.1176)	(0.2135)	(0.1120)	(0.2138)	(0.1182)	(0.2025)
Occasional Crime	-0.9208***	-1.3224***	-0.5534***	-0.7015***	-0.5730***	-0.6379***
	(0.0666)	(0.0757)	(0.0654)	(0.0721)	(0.0682)	(0.0697)
Frequent Crime	-2.0558***	-1.8112***	-1.3460***	-1.0180***	-1.3012***	-0.9976***
	(0.0777)	(0.0804)	(0.0722)	(0.0739)	(0.0727)	(0.0719)
Same Wealth	-0.0407	-0.0581	-0.0745	-0.0965^{+}	-0.0306	-0.0499
	(0.0556)	(0.0588)	(0.0538)	(0.0570)	(0.0559)	(0.0550)
Quality Services	0.0566	0.0761	0.0435	0.0610	0.0940^{+}	0.0155
	(0.0557)	(0.0594)	(0.0541)	(0.0563)	(0.0560)	(0.0557)
Many Devout	0.0499	0.0629	0.0448	0.0644	0.0346	0.0944^{+}
	(0.0555)	(0.0592)	(0.0535)	(0.0569)	(0.0560)	(0.0554)
Highly Social	0.1994***	0.1531**	0.2261***	0.4778***	0.6089***	0.4809***
	(0.0544)	(0.0584)	(0.0537)	(0.0583)	(0.0585)	(0.0571)
R-squared	0.2804	0.0784	0.3006	0.0375	0.2477	0.0369
N	8524	7987	8477	7963	8523	7961

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. The baselines are 20% outgroup, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

8.2 Turkish Preferences for Segregation

A large literature on host attitudes towards immigrants coalesces around main mechanisms to explain dislike of outgroups (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016; Alrababa'h et al., 2021). In this section, we focus on five: economic concerns; ingroup identity attachment and trust; maintenance of cultural superiority; religiosity; and the contact hypothesis in reverse (i.e., lack of meaningful contact leads to dislike of outgroups). For a number of these, we construct indices out of multiple survey questions, standardized to range between 0 and 1 and validated by Principle Component Analysis (PCA) ($\alpha > .70$). Note that the outgroup in these analyses is limited to the Syrian outgroup percent in the neighborhood. If we expand the outgroup to both Syrians and Kurds, results are very similar, with somewhat smaller effect sizes.[18] These effects naturally cannot be interpreted as causal; they nonetheless provide fascinating insight into the correlates of host discrimination against migrants in Adana.

Much research has shown that among hosts in contexts accepting influxes of immigrants, fears of economic competition drives unwillingness to integrate with newcomers. We explore the *Economic Fears* hypothesis by combining questions on agreement with the statement that certain employment sectors should be off limits to Syrians and that Syrians are receiving more assistance from the Turkish government than they deserve. We label this the economic concerns index. Second, we use household wealth. We measured income using a self-reported question on the extent to which the household has great difficulties covering their needs, has some difficulties covering needs, can meet their needs, or can meet their needs and save money. Since Turks had a low proportion (3%) who were able to save, we combined this group into the next wealthiest level who are able to cover the household's needs although cannot save.

[18] Although a few of these subgroup analyses were pre-registered, this section should be seen as exploratory.

For *Identity Attachment* we employ an index of questions on pride in being a member of one's ingroup and on the extent to which the respondent feels Turkish (both on scales of 0-10). We also explore *Outgroup Trust*, using a measure subtracting how much the respondent trusts Syrians from how much s/he trusts Turks.

To consider *Cultural Superiority*, we made an index to capture a latent desire to protect Turkish cultural dominance. We use three questions. We expected that those with most preferences for keeping the nation "pure" would react most strongly to demographic context. To gauge this, we asked: "Given the globalizing world and increasing migration these days, people are developing different attitudes on how societies should react. Do you prefer that government policies strive to maintain the purity of Turkish culture or that policies adapt to and blend in aspects from migrant cultures into Turkish culture?" The outcome scale ranged from 0 (maintain purity) to 10 (blend cultures). A second question asked: "Some people say that it is better for Turkey if different immigrant groups maintain their distinct cultures. Others say that it is better if these groups change so that they adopt the dominant Turkish culture. Where do you place yourself on the following scale: 0 immigrant groups should maintain their distinct cultures to 10 immigrant groups should change so that they adopt the dominant Turkish culture?" For ingroup dominance preferences we also asked, "On a scale from 0 to 10, to what extent do you agree with the following statement: I worry that Turks will become a minority in Turkey." We combined these three measures into a single scale after having flipped the purity question outcome to match the direction of the two other questions, and having confirmed using PCA that these outcomes constitute a single latent factor of preference for Turkish cultural dominance.

Emphasis of shared religion with Syrians has been shown to increase acceptance of them in another experimental study (Lazarev and Sharma, 2017*a*). Thus, we expected that Turk ingroup preferences would be lower for those with higher religiosity scores as the Muslim identity creates cross-cutting cleavage. We asked four questions to get at *Religiosity*: 1)

How often do you pray? (Never to five times a day on a 7 point scale); 2) To what extent do you think that Turkish state law should be reformed to include more Sharia? ; 3) How much do you agree with the following statements: It is better if Muslim women wear a headscarf outside the house?; and 4) How much do you agree with the following statements: Men and women in Turkey interact too freely, there should be more segregation between them? The last three of these questions were on 0 to 10 scales where 0 is no agreement at all and 10 is complete agreement. All of these items mapped very highly onto a single latent factor according to PCA (α<0.73).

Finally, building upon Allport's (1954) widely studied theory that outgroup contact can decrease prejudice, we consider levels of *Contact*. We create a single index from two measures on contact with the outgroup. The first was a subjective measure of contact gauging how often the respondent speaks to Syrians. The second is a question on perceptions of the percentage of one's neighborhood that is made up of Syrians, since living close to others may increase the chance of engaging them.

Figure 10 shows the results of these different sub-group analyses, providing confirmation for all of them. Specifically, it shows the likelihood of moving to a neighborhood as a function of the change between 20 to 80% Syrian, conditioned upon various measures of these mechanisms. In almost all cases, Turkish subgroups have a statistically significant negative response to *Percent Syrian* in the neighborhood. But the size of the negative response varies. Looking first at the economic variables, we see that Turks who score higher on the Economic Concerns index have a significantly larger reaction to increases in percent Syrian than those who score lower on the index. We also see that the most financially secure group of Turks (those who can meet needs or save) are significantly less reactive than those in the middle and low groups. (Of some note, the middle group has the strongest reaction; recall here that "middle" still indicates people who struggle to meet monthly needs at least some of the time).

Turning to the identity variables, Turks who score high on the Ingroup Identity Index and those who have a large trust gap (trust Turks much more than Syrians) also have a stronger reaction to *Percent Syrian*. Turks who score very low on the Identity Index are in the only subgroup who respond positively to increases in the Syrian population. Concerns with cultural superiority similarly are associated with a stronger reaction.

On the other side, we see that Turks who have some degree of contact with Syrians are less reactive than those who have no contact. The same is true of highly religious Turks.

Our study thus shows that Turkish preferences for segregation are strongest amongst the economically anxious; those with a strong allegiance to the Turkish identity; and those concerned with cultural superiority. They are weakest amongst those who have the most contact with Syrians and amongst the very religious.

Figure 10: Marginal Means of Changes in Outgroup Percent and Economic Concerns on Likelihood of Moving to a Neighborhood



Note: OLS regression on Turkish sample, n=8,503 - 8,518 depending on the model. Point estimates are depicted as blue circles with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from standard errors clustered by respondent.

9 Concluding Remarks

This study sought to make two contributions to the literatures on immigrant integration and residential segregation. First, while the bulk of empirical research on this topic draws from Western, democratic contexts, our study seeks to test validated theoretical models of segregation in a very different setting with a forcibly displaced population. Hosts in Western contexts are more culturally distinct from Syrians than Turks are, particularly regarding religion which drives a lot of host rejection of them (e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016) and Adida, Lo and Platas (2019)). In our study, we find similar results among hosts in terms of rejection of Syrians, despite shared, cross-cutting identities like religion. Thus, popular solutions to the refugee "crisis" support suggesting they be left in neighboring countries where they are more culturally similar (e.g., see *Refuge* by Collier and Bates) ignore scholarly work in Africa finding that shared ethnicity between newer and older migrants may actually lead local leaders to emphasize rather small differences between their group members and immigrants to ensure the policing of group boundaries and maintain a competitive, discriminatory edge for longer-term coethnic residents (Adida, 2014). Secondly, our innovative survey experiment capturing causal effects of our treatments on simultaneous host and migrant views and reported likely behaviors makes a unique empirical contribution. Integration is too often studied from the perspective one side or the other; it is too rarely truly studied as a two-sided process (Klarenbeek, 2021). Our experimental design allows us to isolate the effects of *preferences* across immigrants and hosts for/against integration with the outgroup from other factors that also drive preferences to live in a given neighborhood.

We find a lack of symmetry between migrant and host preferences regarding neighborhood segregation: Turkish citizens are driven primarily by desires not to live with Syrians whereas Syrians primarily prefer to live in safe, crime-free neighborhoods regardless of its ethnic composition. This suggests that for the case of Adana, Turkey at least, policymakers and

development practitioners interested in promoting social cohesion need to focus on what drives distaste for Syrian neighbors among citizens to see if they can be ameliorated through combating common stereotypes or misinformation about them or possibly through campaigns designed to prime shared identities (Lazarev and Sharma, 2017*b*) or promote empathy for immigrants (Adida, Lo and Platas, 2018; Simonovits, Kezdi and Kardos, 2018). Yet there remains much to be explored on this topic.

One question that remains surrounds the scope conditions of our work. We consider a context that is less well-studied in the literature on migration. Turkey may present differing conditions than other contexts. At the time we conducted our study, it was what we considered to be a "hard case" of integration as dislike of Syrians specifically was particularly strong. This would suggest that our findings among Turks are particularly strong, although the literature suggests we are likely to find similar, albeit potentially weaker preferences for ingroups among hosts elsewhere. Further, immigrants in Turkey may face more barriers to successful entrepreneurship making it more difficult for refugees to mobilize ethnic resources for economic advancement. Without such incentives for segregation, the mechanism underpinning immigrant "enclave-economy" theories (e.g., Wilson and Portes, 1980) coming out of European and American settings is lacking in our setting, which could be motivating Syrians in our case to strongly desire integration and assimilation. We specifically study a sample of forced migrants fleeing war in their home country. One might wonder if our results would equally apply to labor migrants. Only more research can help us to fully understand the scope conditions of our argument.

An improvement upon our work would be the ability to track residential movements of migrants and host population members over time. Unfortunately, we were unable to access such data in Turkey, but it readily exists in countries with strong histories of collective comprehensive administrative data, such as countries in Northern Europe. Although administrative data offer a wealth of helpful, reliable, longitudinal data that other studies have

exploited (see Section 1), it does not allow researchers to delve into mechanisms concerning preferences or attitudes in the ways that the present study does. Thus, future research would benefit immensely from pairing data from historical registers with conjoint survey experiments like the one analyzed here.

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A Supplementary Information

A.1 Neighborhood Distributions

The map below displays the location of respondents across Adana. Respondents in white are Syrians and respondents in red are Turkish respondents. One can see that certain neighborhoods are predominantly Turkish or Syrian while many respondents live in mixed areas. Based on this information, we can calculate how diverse the neighborhood is in which a re- spondent lives. For this purpose we have to define what a neighborhood is. We follow a simple approach here. First, we define everyone in the distance of 500 meters from the respondent as the immediate neighborhood. Second, we define everyone in the distance of 2km as the broader neighborhood. When showing the results and descriptive information, we follow these two definitions.

Figure A1: Map of Respondents



Note: Fuzzy geolocations of respondents. White are Syrians and Red are Turks.

The table displays the average proportion of Syrians living in the immediate and broader neighborhood of the respondent. We report statistics for all respondents, for all Syrians and for all Turks. We report the mean proportion of Syrians, the median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation. The table shows that respondents live on average in a neighborhood with around 49.75% Syrians in the immediate neighborhood. In the broader neighborhood, respondents on average live in neighborhoods with 50.96% Syrians. For Syrians, the percentage of Syrians in their immediate and broader neighborhood is higher. For Turks, it is lower.

Figure A2: Proportions of Syrians living in the immediate and wider neighborhood of Syrian, Turkish, and all respondents

Population	Neighborhood	Mean	Median	Min	Max	SD
All respondents	Immediate neighborhood	0.498	0.519	0.000	1.000	0.333
Syrians	Immediate neighborhood	0.725	0.780	0.025	1.000	0.231
Turks	Immediate neighborhood	0.270	0.200	0.000	0.882	0.254
All respondents	Wider neighborhood	0.510	0.591	0.000	1.000	0.245
Syrians	Wider neighborhood	0.640	0.663	0.016	1.000	0.180
Turks	Wider neighborhood	0.379	0.375	0.000	0.754	0.230

Note:

The histograms below show the proportion of Syrians in the immediate and wider neighborhood for all Syrian and Turkish respondents.

Figure A3: Proportions of Syrians living in the immediate and wider neighborhood of Syrian and Turkish respondents



A.2 Power Analyses

We conducted power analyses by simulating our design using DeclareDesign. The total sample is ($n = 5000$), with ($n_s = 2500$) Syrian residents of Adana, and ($n_w = n_e = 1250$) Turkish and Kurdish residents of Adana. Our baseline power analysis is based on the following assumptions:

- A sample size of 1250
- 3 tasks per respondent
- An effect size of 5 percentage points when moving from the first attribute level to the last attribute level

Under these assumptions, the experiment is well powered to uncover the effects of the diversity proportions (when included as a continuous variable), as well as a 5 percentage point effect on the binary attributes (80% power). We are also sufficiently powered to detect a 2.5 point interaction effect with 3 tasks per respondent.

A.3 Detailed Results

Table A1: AMCEs Treating Outgroup Percent as a Continuous Versus Factor Variable (Hypothesis 1)

	Continuous	Factor
Percent Outgroup Continuous	-0.0418***	
	(0.0011)	
Occasional Crime	-1.0647***	-1.0608***
	(0.0523)	(0.0519)
Frequent Crime	-1.8707***	-1.8649***
	(0.0566)	(0.0562)
Same Wealth	-0.0179	-0.0062
	(0.0418)	(0.0415)
Quality Services	0.0840*	0.0724^{+}
	(0.0417)	(0.0413)
Many Devout	0.0093	0.0081
	(0.0415)	(0.0411)
Highly Social	0.2304***	0.2358***
	(0.0410)	(0.0407)
Born in Turkey	-1.2791***	-1.2834***
	(0.0556)	(0.0557)
30% Outgroup		-0.7470***
		(0.1037)
40% Outgroup		-1.5849***
		(0.0994)
50% Outgroup		-2.2390***
		(0.0988)
60% Outgroup		-2.7609***
		(0.0994)
70% Outgroup		-3.0797***
		(0.0969)
80% Outgroup		-3.1502***
		(0.0973)
90% Outgroup		-3.1820***
		(0.0955)
R-squared	0.1664	0.1810
N	16524	16524

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the continuous model, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, not social, and Born in Syria. For the factor model, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, not social, Born in Syria, and 20% outgroup.

Table A2: Turks Versus Syrians Outgroup as Factor Variable (Hypotheses 2 and 2a)

	Interaction	Turks	Syrians
Turkey	1.0868***		
	(0.2507)		
30% Outgroup	-0.4843^{+}	-0.5478***	-0.4843^{+}
	(0.2685)	(0.1051)	(0.2685)
40% Outgroup	-0.3427	-1.4349***	-0.3427
	(0.2495)	(0.1033)	(0.2495)
50% Outgroup	-0.3684	-2.2096***	-0.3684
	(0.2368)	(0.1087)	(0.2369)
60% Outgroup	-0.4302^{+}	-3.0009***	-0.4302^{+}
	(0.2337)	(0.1123)	(0.2337)
70% Outgroup	-0.4927*	-3.5879***	-0.4927*
	(0.2288)	(0.1096)	(0.2288)
80% Outgroup	-0.3537	-4.1057***	-0.3537
	(0.2245)	(0.1151)	(0.2245)
90% Outgroup	-0.4421*	-4.3123***	-0.4421*
	(0.2215)	(0.1155)	(0.2215)
Occasional Crime	-1.4447***	-0.6998***	-1.4447***
	(0.0745)	(0.0674)	(0.0745)
Frequent Crime	-2.0721***	-1.6880***	-2.0721***
	(0.0805)	(0.0757)	(0.0806)
Same Wealth	-0.0039	0.0005	-0.0039
	(0.0587)	(0.0557)	(0.0587)
Quality Services	0.1092^{+}	0.0694	0.1092^{+}
	(0.0584)	(0.0558)	(0.0584)
Many Devout	0.0106	0.0170	0.0106
	(0.0583)	(0.0555)	(0.0583)
Highly Social	0.2476***	0.2113***	0.2476***
	(0.0584)	(0.0542)	(0.0584)
Turkey × 30% Outgroup	-0.0635		
	(0.2883)		
Turkey × 40% Outgroup	-1.0922***		
	(0.2700)		
Turkey × 50% Outgroup	-1.8412***		
	(0.2606)		
Turkey × 60% Outgroup	-2.5707***		
	(0.2592)		
Turkey × 70% Outgroup	-3.0952***		
	(0.2537)		
Turkey × 80% Outgroup	-3.7520***		
	(0.2523)		
Turkey × 90% Outgroup	-3.8703***		
	(0.2498)		
Turkey × Occasional Crime	0.7449***		
	(0.1004)		
Turkey × Frequent Crime	0.3841***		
	(0.1105)		
Turkey × Same Wealth	0.0044		
	(0.0809)		
Turkey × Quality Services	-0.0398		
	(0.0808)		
Turkey × Many Devout	0.0063		
	(0.0806)		
Turkey × Highly Social	-0.0363		
	(0.0797)		
R-squared	0.2208	0.3006	0.1012
N	16524	8521	8003

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the interacted model, baselines are born in Syria, 20% outgroup, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are 20% outgroup, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

Table A3: Turks Versus Syrians Continuous Outgroup Variable (Hypotheses 2 and 2a)

	Full_Sample	Turks	Syrians
Turkey	2.6068***		
	(0.1784)		
Outgroup_Percent	-0.0015	-0.0657***	-0.0015
	(0.0016)	(0.0013)	(0.0016)
Occasional Crime	-1.4424***	-0.6961***	-1.4424***
	(0.0744)	(0.0674)	(0.0744)
Frequent Crime	-2.0728***	-1.6840***	-2.0728***
	(0.0805)	(0.0759)	(0.0805)
Same Wealth	-0.0030	-0.0055	-0.0030
	(0.0586)	(0.0559)	(0.0586)
Quality Services	0.1113+	0.0751	0.1113+
	(0.0583)	(0.0559)	(0.0583)
Many Devout	0.0116	0.0236	0.0116
	(0.0583)	(0.0557)	(0.0583)
Highly Social	0.2490***	0.2086***	0.2490***
	(0.0584)	(0.0543)	(0.0584)
Turkey × Outgroup_Percent	-0.0643***		
	(0.0021)		
Turkey × Occasional Crime	0.7463***		
	(0.1004)		
Turkey × Frequent Crime	0.3887***		
	(0.1106)		
Turkey × Same Wealth	-0.0025		
	(0.0810)		
Turkey × Quality Services	-0.0361		
	(0.0808)		
Turkey × Many Devout	0.0120		
	(0.0806)		
Turkey × Highly Social	-0.0404		
	(0.0797)		
R-squared	0.2180	0.2960	0.1006
N	16524	8521	8003

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the interacted model, baselines are born in Syria, 20% outgroup, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are 20% outgroup, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

Table A4: Syrian Outgroup Percent Among Turks

Syrian Percent	-0.0962***	
	(0.0017)	
Occasional Crime	-0.7232***	-0.7226***
	(0.0618)	(0.0614)
Frequent Crime	-1.7064***	-1.7110***
	(0.0721)	(0.0719)
Same Wealth	-0.0156	-0.0198
	(0.0525)	(0.0521)
Quality Services	0.0716	0.0731
	(0.0522)	(0.0520)
Many Devout	0.0158	0.0133
	(0.0519)	(0.0517)
Highly Social	0.2027***	0.1985***
	(0.0507)	(0.0506)
20% Syrian		-0.9864***
		(0.0739)
30% Syrian		-1.9961***
		(0.0836)
40% Syrian		-3.2817***
		(0.0985)
50% Syrian		-4.3360***
		(0.1102)
60% Syrian		-4.9484***
		(0.1192)
70% Syrian		-5.5113***
		(0.1460)
80% Syrian		-5.3539***
		(0.2078)
R-squared	0.3804	0.3878
N	8521	8521

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the Hypothesis 3 model with continuous outgroup variables employed, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For the Hypothesis 3a model, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, not social, 10% Kurdish, and 10% Syrian.

A.4 Additional Survey Questions

As an alternative to living in the neighborhood, which represents a very large commitment to integration, we consider a softer version: willingness to visit the neighborhood to go to a restaurant, market or shop. [19]

Primary Outcome Question:

(Move) Consider a situation where you can no longer stay in your current neighborhood and must find a new place to live very soon. If you found suitable and affordable housing in this new neighborhood that I just described, and you are able to move here, how likely would you be to move to it?

0 Not at all likely – 10 Very likely

I Don't Know

Refuse to Answer

Additional Outcome Questions:

(Visit) On a scale from 0 to 10, how likely would you be to go to a restaurant, shop, or market in this neighborhood?

0 Not at all likely – 10 Very likely

I Don't Know

Refuse to Answer

[19]The neighborhood profile is re-read before each of these secondary questions.

Figure A4: Visit the Neighborhood



Note: OLS run on outcome of willingness to visit the neighborhood (n=7,991). Turk point estimates are shown as black circles. Syrian point estimates are shown as blue Xs. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

(Welcome) If you were to move to this neighborhood, to what extent do you feel you would be welcomed by the residents living there?

0 Not at all likely – 10 Very likely

I Don't Know

Refuse to Answer

(Safe) How safe would you feel living in this neighborhood?

0 Not at all likely – 10 Very likely

I Don't Know

Refuse to Answer

(Help) If you needed help with something (fixing something, having someone watch your children for an hour, finding a job, etc,), how likely is it that you think you could find assistance in this neighborhood?

0 Not at all likely – 10 Very likely

I Don't Know

Refuse to Answer

A.5 Balance Tests, Round Effects, and Noncompliance Across All Profiles

To test for balance, Table A5 shows our main OLS model regressed on respondent demographics instead of willingness to move. The experimental arms are balanced across respondent demographics even for subsamples of Turks versus Syrians with the exception of some slight imbalances for age among the Turkish outgroup arms.

Table A5: Balance Tests

	Age Turks	Age Syrians	Gender Turks	Gender Syrians	Ed Turks	Ed Syrians	Wealth Turks	Wealth Syrians
30% Outgroup	-0.0560	-0.1669	-0.1186	-0.3475	0.0496	0.1900	-0.0227	0.0225
	(0.0613)	(0.1280)	(0.1139)	(0.2932)	(0.0600)	(0.1289)	(0.0306)	(0.0676)
40% Outgroup	-0.0755	-0.0248	0.0659	-0.5051^{+}	0.0748	0.0928	-0.0266	0.0492
	(0.0618)	(0.1193)	(0.1122)	(0.2772)	(0.0585)	(0.1222)	(0.0299)	(0.0630)
50% Outgroup	-0.1771**	-0.0350	0.1029	-0.2959	0.1515*	0.0571	-0.0149	0.0297
	(0.0615)	(0.1144)	(0.1188)	(0.2598)	(0.0612)	(0.1159)	(0.0309)	(0.0589)
60% Outgroup	-0.0905	-0.0142	0.1265	-0.3562	0.0848	0.0616	0.0264	0.0324
	(0.0616)	(0.1112)	(0.1166)	(0.2512)	(0.0592)	(0.1162)	(0.0306)	(0.0565)
70% Outgroup	-0.0673	-0.0175	0.0649	-0.2741	0.0102	0.0166	0.0122	0.0418
	(0.0600)	(0.1100)	(0.1128)	(0.2499)	(0.0596)	(0.1138)	(0.0300)	(0.0551)
80% Outgroup	-0.1314*	-0.0495	-0.1088	-0.2859	0.0456	0.0356	-0.0019	0.0490
	(0.0618)	(0.1069)	(0.1150)	(0.2426)	(0.0610)	(0.1122)	(0.0309)	(0.0547)
90% Outgroup	-0.0754	-0.0348	0.0883	-0.2418	0.0592	0.0441	0.0161	0.0426
	(0.0606)	(0.1064)	(0.1125)	(0.2402)	(0.0602)	(0.1095)	(0.0306)	(0.0526)
Occasional Crime	0.0443	-0.0175	-0.0621	-0.0208	-0.0415	0.0167	-0.0012	0.0207
	(0.0372)	(0.0335)	(0.0696)	(0.0822)	(0.0361)	(0.0320)	(0.0177)	(0.0188)
Frequent Crime	0.0060	-0.0441	0.0243	-0.1019	-0.0102	0.0004	-0.0040	-0.0081
	(0.0379)	(0.0347)	(0.0698)	(0.0824)	(0.0368)	(0.0310)	(0.0182)	(0.0190)
Same Wealth	-0.0365	0.0170	-0.0345	-0.0790	0.0202	-0.0245	-0.0000	-0.0269^{+}
	(0.0304)	(0.0282)	(0.0582)	(0.0666)	(0.0299)	(0.0264)	(0.0152)	(0.0156)
Quality Services	0.0306	0.0044	-0.0597	0.0050	-0.0322	0.0295	0.0139	0.0152
	(0.0304)	(0.0274)	(0.0575)	(0.0667)	(0.0295)	(0.0259)	(0.0158)	(0.0160)
Many Devout	0.0115	-0.0260	0.0092	-0.0033	0.0065	0.0080	0.0117	0.0292^{+}
	(0.0307)	(0.0278)	(0.0587)	(0.0674)	(0.0305)	(0.0257)	(0.0150)	(0.0153)
Highly Social	0.0290	-0.0204	0.0752	0.0852	0.0023	0.0305	-0.0053	0.0134
	(0.0301)	(0.0279)	(0.0577)	(0.0665)	(0.0290)	(0.0262)	(0.0142)	(0.0151)
R-squared	0.0018	0.0009	0.0017	0.0014	0.0014	0.0012	0.0009	0.0015
N	8526	8013	8478	7011	8514	7983	8508	7962

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the full model, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For all models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

We also checked for round effects. Table A6 presents our results by round subsamples, demonstrating that our main findings hold across the three separate rounds even when subdivided further by Syrian and Turkish respondents.

Table A6: Round Effects

	Turks1	Syrians1	Turks2	Syrians2	Turks3	Syrians3
30% Outgroup	-0.7427***	-0.0793	-0.4217*	-0.6448	-0.4422*	-0.4905
	(0.1843)	(0.5199)	(0.1820)	(0.4606)	(0.1844)	(0.4167)
40% Outgroup	-1.3481***	0.0811	-1.4120***	-0.8140^{+}	-1.5342***	-0.0872
	(0.1860)	(0.4918)	(0.1819)	(0.4295)	(0.1790)	(0.3703)
50% Outgroup	-2.2364***	-0.3349	-2.1981***	-0.5498	-2.1796***	-0.0258
	(0.1913)	(0.4699)	(0.1853)	(0.4106)	(0.1880)	(0.3466)
60% Outgroup	-2.9348***	-0.2634	-3.1665***	-0.5181	-2.9021***	-0.3217
	(0.1905)	(0.4625)	(0.1906)	(0.4020)	(0.1901)	(0.3399)
70% Outgroup	-3.7925***	-0.1855	-3.5457***	-0.7864*	-3.4309***	-0.3140
	(0.1985)	(0.4565)	(0.1787)	(0.3943)	(0.1833)	(0.3341)
80% Outgroup	-4.0369***	-0.0940	-4.3093***	-0.5427	-3.9672***	-0.2525
	(0.1916)	(0.4491)	(0.1907)	(0.3892)	(0.1897)	(0.3273)
90% Outgroup	-4.4172***	-0.2108	-4.1967***	-0.6875^{+}	-4.3061***	-0.2643
	(0.1942)	(0.4452)	(0.1900)	(0.3849)	(0.1895)	(0.3206)
Occasional Crime	-0.7852***	-0.3776**	-0.6144***	-1.9890***	-0.6951***	-1.9508***
	(0.1155)	(0.1323)	(0.1140)	(0.1110)	(0.1155)	(0.1115)
Frequent Crime	-1.6466***	-0.6034***	-1.6147***	-3.0155***	-1.7903***	-2.5874***
	(0.1219)	(0.1336)	(0.1215)	(0.1220)	(0.1166)	(0.1269)
Same Wealth	0.0839	0.0768	-0.0293	0.0180	-0.0584	-0.0916
	(0.0972)	(0.1088)	(0.0961)	(0.0956)	(0.0941)	(0.0963)
Quality Services	0.0506	-0.1910^{+}	-0.0770	0.2135*	0.2408*	0.2563**
	(0.0973)	(0.1087)	(0.0959)	(0.0953)	(0.0940)	(0.0963)
Many Devout	-0.0906	-0.2004^{+}	0.1805^{+}	0.1509	-0.0308	0.0522
	(0.0974)	(0.1081)	(0.0963)	(0.0952)	(0.0945)	(0.0964)
Highly Social	0.2664**	0.1051	0.2510**	0.4531***	0.1224	0.1787^{+}
	(0.0971)	(0.1081)	(0.0959)	(0.0952)	(0.0942)	(0.0965)
R-squared	0.2887	0.0120	0.3069	0.2178	0.3136	0.1672
N	2841	2668	2840	2668	2840	2667

Note: $+$ 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the full model, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.5.1 Those who Refuse to Move

Some respondents may report that they would be very unlikely to move regardless of the neighborhood shown. Less than 1% of our sample answered 0 on the likelihood to move scale across all three neighborhood profiles shown them. We ran a robustness check dropping this subsample of 145 out. Table A7 demonstrates that dropping out respondents who chose 0 on

our scale of likelihood of moving across all three neighborhood profiles (signaling an extreme unwillingness to move, n=145 of 16,545 profiles shown), does not change our substantive findings.

Table A7: Those Unlikely to Move Across All 3 Rounds Excluded

	Full_Sample	Turks	Syrians
Turkey	1.4342***		
	(0.2294)		
30% Outgroup	-0.4253	-0.5239***	-0.4378
	(0.2683)	(0.1039)	(0.2681)
40% Outgroup	-0.3492	-1.4189***	-0.3481
	(0.2492)	(0.1027)	(0.2496)
50% Outgroup	-0.3574	-2.1602***	-0.3534
	(0.2371)	(0.1087)	(0.2368)
60% Outgroup	-0.3883+	-2.9651***	-0.3890+
	(0.2333)	(0.1116)	(0.2330)
70% Outgroup	-0.4574*	-3.5631***	-0.4614*
	(0.2294)	(0.1093)	(0.2292)
80% Outgroup	-0.3065	-4.0856***	-0.3048
	(0.2242)	(0.1154)	(0.2243)
90% Outgroup	-0.4223+	-4.2734***	-0.4267+
	(0.2215)	(0.1159)	(0.2215)
Turkey × 30% Outgroup	-0.0918		
	(0.2876)		
Turkey × 40% Outgroup	-1.0551***		
	(0.2695)		
Turkey × 50% Outgroup	-1.7949***		
	(0.2607)		
Turkey × 60% Outgroup	-2.5727***		
	(0.2586)		
Turkey × 70% Outgroup	-3.1080***		
	(0.2542)		
Turkey × 80% Outgroup	-3.7671***		
	(0.2521)		
Turkey × 90% Outgroup	-3.8431***		
	(0.2499)		
Occasional Crime	-1.0616***	-0.7098***	-1.4332***
	(0.0502)	(0.0673)	(0.0740)
Frequent Crime	-1.8359***	-1.6679***	-2.0150***
	(0.0546)	(0.0752)	(0.0791)
Same Wealth	-0.0002	0.0113	-0.0115
	(0.0403)	(0.0555)	(0.0584)
Quality Services	0.0887*	0.0792	0.0997+
	(0.0404)	(0.0557)	(0.0585)
Many Devout	0.0261	0.0343	0.0119
	(0.0401)	(0.0554)	(0.0581)
Highly Social	0.2222***	0.2101***	0.2327***
	(0.0397)	(0.0538)	(0.0582)
R-squared	0.2170	0.3009	0.0980
N	16379	8434	7945

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the full model, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6 Robustness Checks

A.6.1 Social Desirability Bias

A major threat to inference in this study is if Syrians or Turks felt pressure not to admit dislike of one another, even despite the experimental design's efforts at mitigating social desirability bias. We asked two questions, one right after our experiments and one at the end of the survey that tap into such social pressures. The first question asked the respondent the extent to which he/she felt able to state true opinions about members of other groups in the survey. The second question asked the extent to which the respondent felt he/she could sincerely answer our questions. Both were on a scale of 0 to 10. The distributions in Figure A5 of these responses show that Syrians are indeed more sensitive to respondent to questions about outgroups than are Turks. As a robustness check on our results, we run analyses dropping out anyone who answered a 0 on either of these questions as well as anyone who averaged below 7 across the two questions. The second test is clearly more stringent. See table A8.

Figure A5: Histograms of Sincere Responses,



Table A8: Social Desirability Bias Checks

	0s Dropped	Above 7 Average
Turkey	1.0359***	0.8945***
	(0.2520)	(0.2601)
30% Outgroup	-0.5305^{+}	-0.6460*
	(0.2710)	(0.2850)
40% Outgroup	-0.4032	-0.4787^{+}
	(0.2519)	(0.2648)
50% Outgroup	-0.4163^{+}	-0.4054
	(0.2392)	(0.2502)
60% Outgroup	-0.4515^{+}	-0.4771^{+}
	(0.2357)	(0.2470)
70% Outgroup	-0.5325*	-0.6013*
	(0.2307)	(0.2401)
80% Outgroup	-0.4128^{+}	-0.4913*
	(0.2263)	(0.2352)
90% Outgroup	-0.4963*	-0.6180**
	(0.2231)	(0.2313)
Occasional Crime	-1.4413***	-1.6061***
	(0.0748)	(0.0805)
Frequent Crime	-2.0674***	-2.2956***
	(0.0812)	(0.0877)
Same Wealth	0.0035	0.0240
	(0.0593)	(0.0640)
Quality Services	0.1109^{+}	0.1242^{+}
	(0.0587)	(0.0639)
Many Devout	0.0057	-0.0064
	(0.0588)	(0.0644)
Highly Social	0.2537***	0.2794***
	(0.0588)	(0.0642)
Turkey × 30% Outgroup	-0.0176	0.0863
	(0.2908)	(0.3039)
Turkey × 40% Outgroup	-1.0331***	-0.9693***
	(0.2724)	(0.2844)
Turkey × 50% Outgroup	-1.7946***	-1.8049***
	(0.2629)	(0.2730)
Turkey × 60% Outgroup	-2.5485***	-2.5333***
	(0.2612)	(0.2716)
Turkey × 70% Outgroup	-3.0660***	-3.0092***
	(0.2556)	(0.2643)
Turkey × 80% Outgroup	-3.6943***	-3.6231***
	(0.2540)	(0.2622)
Turkey × 90% Outgroup	-3.8179***	-3.7124***
	(0.2514)	(0.2590)
Turkey × Occasional Crime	0.7429***	0.9148***
	(0.1007)	(0.1052)
Turkey × Frequent Crime	0.3828***	0.6053***
	(0.1111)	(0.1162)
Turkey × Same Wealth	0.0030	-0.0221
	(0.0814)	(0.0851)
Turkey × Quality Services	-0.0461	-0.0573
	(0.0811)	(0.0851)
Turkey × Many Devout	0.0071	0.0172
	(0.0810)	(0.0853)
Turkey × Highly Social	-0.0422	-0.0658
	(0.0801)	(0.0843)
R-squared	0.2220	0.2320
N	16360	15332

Note: $^{+}$ 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For both models, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.2 Results by Education and Income

Educational attainment is a demographic characteristic that varies greatly across our Syrian and Turkish subsamples. We ran an analysis to see how educational attainment might affect our outcomes. The educational attainment categories are the same as those shown in the Demographics Table (1 in the paper: Less than primary school, primary education, middle school education, secondary education, two-year degree or community college, or university degree or higher.

Wealth is a factor that is very different across our Syrian and Turkish subsamples. We ran some checks to see how household wealth might affect our outcomes. We measured income using a self-reported question on the extent to which the household has great difficulties covering their needs, has some difficulties covering needs, can meet their needs, or can meet their needs and save money. Since both groups had very low proportions (3%) who were able to save, we mixed this group into the next wealthiest level who are able to cover the household's needs but not save. Table A10 shows the full sample model with a control for income level included as well as subsamples for low wealth (Income 1), medium wealth (Income 2), and high wealth (Income 3). Our results hold controlling for household wealth and our findings on Turkish distaste for outgroups remain across all income level subsamples. Interestingly, the finding on crime seems to hold strongest among the subsample of the middle wealth (Turks are more accepting of occasional and frequent crime than Syrians), whereas for the highest and lowest wealth groups Turks are more accepting of occasional crime but less accepting of frequent crime compared to Syrians.

Table A9: Educational Attainment Effects

	Full_Sample	Turks	Syrians
Educational Attainment	0.2956***	-0.0090	0.1802
	(0.0827)	(0.0779)	(0.1746)
30% Outgroup	-0.4207	-0.1912	0.1559
	(0.2713)	(0.2814)	(0.6498)
40% Outgroup	-1.2670***	-1.1107***	0.1422
	(0.2569)	(0.2705)	(0.5937)
50% Outgroup	-1.7277***	-1.8050***	0.1163
	(0.2533)	(0.2818)	(0.5539)
60% Outgroup	-1.9744***	-2.4703***	-0.0389
	(0.2592)	(0.3017)	(0.5382)
70% Outgroup	-2.1937***	-3.0783***	-0.1477
	(0.2516)	(0.2935)	(0.5274)
80% Outgroup	-2.1111***	-3.7806***	0.0908
	(0.2551)	(0.3070)	(0.5247)
90% Outgroup	-2.0287***	-3.9090***	0.0997
	(0.2485)	(0.3108)	(0.5104)
Occasional Crime	-1.1567***	-0.7321***	-1.1750***
	(0.1266)	(0.1731)	(0.1843)
Frequent Crime	-1.5918***	-1.1064***	-1.8733***
	(0.1388)	(0.1989)	(0.1987)
Quality Services	-0.0897	-0.0873	-0.0697
	(0.1033)	(0.1516)	(0.1465)
Highly Social	0.1765^{+}	0.0827	0.1920
	(0.1005)	(0.1434)	(0.1469)
Many Devout	-0.0637	-0.0303	-0.0998
	(0.1010)	(0.1480)	(0.1415)
Same Wealth	0.0551	0.2074	-0.0865
	(0.1022)	(0.1475)	(0.1452)
Turkey	-0.4328**		
	(0.1426)		
30% Outgroup × Educational Attainment	-0.1010	-0.1065	-0.2298
	(0.0800)	(0.0822)	(0.2127)
40% Outgroup × Educational Attainment	-0.0942	-0.0947	-0.1831
	(0.0755)	(0.0779)	(0.1977)
50% Outgroup × Educational Attainment	-0.1507*	-0.1156	-0.1724
	(0.0745)	(0.0800)	(0.1823)
60% Outgroup × Educational Attainment	-0.2426**	-0.1592^{+}	-0.1370
	(0.0761)	(0.0845)	(0.1756)
70% Outgroup × Educational Attainment	-0.2804***	-0.1566^{+}	-0.1217
	(0.0746)	(0.0840)	(0.1710)
80% Outgroup × Educational Attainment	-0.3350***	-0.1000	-0.1641
	(0.0754)	(0.0875)	(0.1680)
90% Outgroup × Educational Attainment	-0.3736***	-0.1187	-0.1978
	(0.0736)	(0.0882)	(0.1634)
Occasional Crime × Educational Attainment	0.0311	0.0092	-0.1041
	(0.0390)	(0.0487)	(0.0651)
Frequent Crime × Educational Attainment	-0.0918*	-0.1775**	-0.0727
	(0.0426)	(0.0560)	(0.0692)
Quality Services × Educational Attainment	0.0526	0.0452	0.0677
	(0.0323)	(0.0424)	(0.0530)
Highly Social × Educational Attainment	0.0191	0.0374	0.0228
	(0.0307)	(0.0396)	(0.0525)
Many Devout × Educational Attainment	0.0250	0.0158	0.0408
	(0.0312)	(0.0418)	(0.0498)
Same Wealth × Educational Attainment	-0.0186	-0.0623	0.0322
	(0.0318)	(0.0421)	(0.0516)
Turkey × Educational Attainment	-0.2691***		
	(0.0456)		
R-squared	0.1867	0.3079	0.1020
N	16483	8509	7974

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression on willingness to move to the neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the full model, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

Table A10: Household Wealth Effects

	Full_Sample	Turks	Syrians
Household Wealth	0.2222	-0.5004**	-0.2848
	(0.1517)	(0.1534)	(0.3990)
30% Outgroup	-1.2592***	-0.5955^{+}	-0.9850
	(0.3253)	(0.3552)	(0.6579)
40% Outgroup	-1.9669***	-1.8708***	-0.7081
	(0.3013)	(0.3483)	(0.6000)
50% Outgroup	-2.4586***	-3.2335***	-0.5911
	(0.2975)	(0.3747)	(0.5682)
60% Outgroup	-2.4545***	-3.9972***	-0.7302
	(0.2918)	(0.3604)	(0.5516)
70% Outgroup	-2.5086***	-4.9602***	-0.8126
	(0.2873)	(0.3582)	(0.5428)
80% Outgroup	-2.1317***	-5.4541***	-0.5763
	(0.2847)	(0.3745)	(0.5382)
90% Outgroup	-2.2228***	-5.5265***	-0.9197^{+}
	(0.2791)	(0.3775)	(0.5327)
Occasional Crime	-1.6416***	-1.1021***	-1.3975***
	(0.1331)	(0.2269)	(0.1826)
Frequent Crime	-2.5519***	-2.5181***	-2.5190***
	(0.1446)	(0.2543)	(0.1970)
Quality Services	0.1873^{+}	0.0971	0.3008*
	(0.1069)	(0.1879)	(0.1466)
Highly Social	0.2672*	0.3508*	0.2149
	(0.1047)	(0.1788)	(0.1434)
Many Devout	0.0059	0.0915	-0.1212
	(0.1071)	(0.1916)	(0.1451)
Same Wealth	-0.1539	-0.2422	-0.1967
	(0.1082)	(0.1906)	(0.1452)
Turkey	-0.8158***		
	(0.1648)		
30% Outgroup × Household Wealth	0.2661^{+}	0.0133	0.3647
	(0.1536)	(0.1642)	(0.4577)
40% Outgroup × Household Wealth	0.2101	0.1941	0.2700
	(0.1421)	(0.1590)	(0.4240)
50% Outgroup × Household Wealth	0.1401	0.4711**	0.1581
	(0.1398)	(0.1668)	(0.4018)
60% Outgroup × Household Wealth	-0.1434	0.4529**	0.2232
	(0.1394)	(0.1637)	(0.3934)
70% Outgroup × Household Wealth	-0.2920*	0.6324***	0.2342
	(0.1378)	(0.1636)	(0.3877)
80% Outgroup × Household Wealth	-0.5630***	0.6234***	0.1642
	(0.1372)	(0.1689)	(0.3890)
90% Outgroup × Household Wealth	-0.5399***	0.5540***	0.3520
	(0.1346)	(0.1675)	(0.3838)
Occasional Crime × Household Wealth	0.3275***	0.1883^{+}	-0.0354
	(0.0674)	(0.1000)	(0.1215)
Frequent Crime × Household Wealth	0.3894***	0.3902***	0.3271*
	(0.0757)	(0.1153)	(0.1327)
Quality Services × Household Wealth	-0.0653	-0.0137	-0.1359
	(0.0552)	(0.0835)	(0.0977)
Highly Social × Household Wealth	-0.0187	-0.0635	0.0236
	(0.0538)	(0.0796)	(0.0952)
Many Devout × Household Wealth	0.0020	-0.0334	0.0971
	(0.0556)	(0.0858)	(0.0967)
Same Wealth × Household Wealth	0.0838	0.1106	0.1441
	(0.0565)	(0.0860)	(0.0972)
Turkey × Household Wealth	-0.2965***		
	(0.0876)		
R-squared	0.1891	0.3053	0.1046
N	16458	8503	7955

Note: $+$ 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression on willingness to move to the neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the full model, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.3 Perceived Outgroup Living in Neighborhood

Having more of the outgroup living in your neighborhood may affect your likelihood to move to another neighborhood with high proportions of outgroups in it. We asked our respondents what proportion of their neighborhood are members of outgroups. We wondered if those who currently perceive themselves as living with higher proportions of outgroup members in their neighborhood are also more open to doing so in our experiment. We find this is indeed the case, although we cannot know if people who live among more outgroup members are simply more open to them after having lived next to them for some time or if these people chose to move to areas of Adana that are more dominated by outgroup members due to pre-existing preferences to live in more diverse areas.

Table A11: Perceived Outgroup Living in Neighborhood

	Full_Sample	Turks	Syrians
Perceived Outgroup	-0.0263***	0.0038	0.0076
	(0.0040)	(0.0051)	(0.0086)
30% Outgroup	-0.7428***	-0.8040***	-0.3401
	(0.2208)	(0.2319)	(0.8024)
40% Outgroup	-2.0039***	-1.9999***	0.0759
	(0.2074)	(0.2298)	(0.7171)
50% Outgroup	-3.0905***	-2.5870***	-0.6676
	(0.2096)	(0.2332)	(0.7066)
60% Outgroup	-3.9051***	-3.4741***	-0.3398
	(0.2049)	(0.2384)	(0.7217)
70% Outgroup	-4.4046***	-4.1767***	-0.0839
	(0.2015)	(0.2349)	(0.6946)
80% Outgroup	-4.8622***	-4.9006***	0.0738
	(0.2008)	(0.2421)	(0.6732)
90% Outgroup	-4.8626***	-5.2110***	0.0834
	(0.2011)	(0.2436)	(0.6758)
Occasional Crime	-0.7826***	-0.5950***	-1.7035***
	(0.1069)	(0.1407)	(0.1951)
Frequent Crime	-1.7267***	-1.7601***	-2.1360***
	(0.1167)	(0.1622)	(0.2114)
Quality Services	0.1778*	0.2057+	0.3592*
	(0.0849)	(0.1182)	(0.1481)
Highly Social	0.4842***	0.2734*	0.8995***
	(0.0835)	(0.1141)	(0.1468)
Many Devout	0.1580+	0.1003	0.3788*
	(0.0834)	(0.1153)	(0.1506)
Same Wealth	-0.0566	0.0071	-0.0741
	(0.0868)	(0.1176)	(0.1556)
Turkey	-2.5293***		
	(0.1371)		
30% Outgroup × Perceived Outgroup	0.0014	0.0064	-0.0019
	(0.0043)	(0.0053)	(0.0098)
40% Outgroup × Perceived Outgroup	0.0112**	0.0140**	-0.0059
	(0.0040)	(0.0052)	(0.0088)
50% Outgroup × Perceived Outgroup	0.0203***	0.0092+	0.0041
	(0.0039)	(0.0052)	(0.0087)
60% Outgroup × Perceived Outgroup	0.0261***	0.0119*	-0.0011
	(0.0039)	(0.0056)	(0.0088)
70% Outgroup × Perceived Outgroup	0.0290***	0.0147**	-0.0058
	(0.0038)	(0.0054)	(0.0085)
80% Outgroup × Perceived Outgroup	0.0354***	0.0200***	-0.0058
	(0.0037)	(0.0058)	(0.0082)
90% Outgroup × Perceived Outgroup	0.0345***	0.0226***	-0.0072
	(0.0037)	(0.0058)	(0.0082)
Occasional Crime × Perceived Outgroup	-0.0051**	-0.0026	0.0035
	(0.0017)	(0.0033)	(0.0025)
Frequent Crime × Perceived Outgroup	-0.0026	0.0018	0.0009
	(0.0019)	(0.0037)	(0.0027)
Quality Services × Perceived Outgroup	-0.0018	-0.0034	-0.0034+
	(0.0013)	(0.0027)	(0.0019)
Highly Social × Perceived Outgroup	-0.0046***	-0.0017	-0.0090***
	(0.0013)	(0.0026)	(0.0019)
Many Devout × Perceived Outgroup	-0.0026*	-0.0021	-0.0050**
	(0.0013)	(0.0027)	(0.0019)
Same Wealth × Perceived Outgroup	0.0011	-0.0001	0.0012
	(0.0014)	(0.0026)	(0.0020)
Turkey × Perceived Outgroup	0.0255***		
	(0.0023)		
R-squared	0.1994	0.3104	0.1084
N	16518	8518	8000

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. Baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.4 Turkish Dominance Scale

We pre-registered exploratory analyses concerning boundary policing of the host culture and of the migrant culture. We expected that across both samples, those with most preferences for keeping the nation "pure" would react most strongly to demographic context. To gauge this, we asked: "Given the globalizing world and increasing migration these days, people are developing different attitudes on how societies should react. Do you prefer that government policies strive to maintain the purity of Turkish culture or that policies adapt to and blend in aspects from migrant cultures into Turkish culture?" The outcome scale ranged from 0 (maintain purity) to 10 (blend cultures). The mean for Syrians was 4.78 and for Turks it was 0.62 with about 83% of Turks responding 0 and 12% of Syrians doing so.

We also asked, "On a scale from 0 to 10, to what extent do you agree with the following statement: I worry that Turks will become a minority in Turkey." The mean for Syrians was 1.61 and for Turks it was 7.51 with about 46% of Turks responding 10 and just 1% of Syrians doing so (66% of Syrians responded 0). For boundary policing in migrant group, we asked: "Some people say that it is better for Turkey if different immigrant groups maintain their distinct cultures. Others say that it is better if these groups change so that they adopt the dominant Turkish culture. Where do you place yourself on the following scale: From 0 immigrant groups should maintain their distinct cultures; to 10 immigrant groups should change so that they adopt the dominant Turkish culture?" The mean for Syrians was 4.84 and for Turks it was 7.84 with about 62% of Turks responding 10 and 8% of Syrians doing so.

We combined these three measures into a single scale after having flipped the purity question outcome to match the direction of the two other questions, and having confirmed using principal component analysis (PCA) that these outcomes constitute a single latent factor of preference for Turkish cultural dominance ($\alpha > 0.7$). The index was standardized to range between 0 and 1.

Table A12: Turkish Dominance

	Turks	Syrians
Turk_Dominance_Index	3.1899***	-0.5460
	(0.6024)	(2.0850)
30% Outgroup	-0.3450	-0.8362
	(0.5125)	(0.9224)
40% Outgroup	-0.8871^{+}	-0.7051
	(0.4989)	(0.9140)
50% Outgroup	-0.8175^{+}	-0.2663
	(0.4874)	(0.8659)
60% Outgroup	-1.3602**	-0.9686
	(0.4930)	(0.8313)
70% Outgroup	-1.0534*	-0.1991
	(0.5218)	(0.8248)
80% Outgroup	-1.6836**	-0.2639
	(0.5218)	(0.8050)
90% Outgroup	-2.6395***	-0.4657
	(0.5195)	(0.8113)
Occasional Crime	-0.0876	-2.8291***
	(0.3014)	(0.2580)
Frequent Crime	-0.8139*	-3.8283***
	(0.3402)	(0.2892)
Quality Services	0.2592	0.3897^{+}
	(0.2568)	(0.2156)
Highly Social	0.4264^{+}	0.5635**
	(0.2341)	(0.2148)
Many Devout	0.3594	0.3185
	(0.2495)	(0.2172)
Same Wealth	0.1953	-0.1809
	(0.2503)	(0.2168)
30% Outgroup × Turk_Dominance_Index	-0.2599	0.9612
	(0.6374)	(2.2756)
40% Outgroup × Turk_Dominance_Index	-0.7046	0.9545
	(0.6246)	(2.2556)
50% Outgroup × Turk_Dominance_Index	-1.8078**	-0.3088
	(0.6210)	(2.1531)
60% Outgroup × Turk_Dominance_Index	-2.1440***	1.4974
	(0.6330)	(2.0240)
70% Outgroup × Turk_Dominance_Index	-3.3203***	-0.8452
	(0.6587)	(2.0380)
80% Outgroup × Turk_Dominance_Index	-3.1461***	-0.2792
	(0.6640)	(1.9916)
90% Outgroup × Turk_Dominance_Index	-2.1907**	0.0474
	(0.6679)	(2.0066)
Occasional Crime × Turk_Dominance_Index	-0.7911*	3.7796***
	(0.3879)	(0.6320)
Frequent Crime × Turk_Dominance_Index	-1.1409**	4.7610***
	(0.4361)	(0.7251)
Quality Services × Turk_Dominance_Index	-0.2347	-0.7738
	(0.3300)	(0.5410)
Highly Social × Turk_Dominance_Index	-0.2775	-0.8343
	(0.3016)	(0.5308)
Many Devout × Turk_Dominance_Index	-0.4448	-0.8493
	(0.3206)	(0.5401)
Same Wealth × Turk_Dominance_Index	-0.2675	0.4792
	(0.3211)	(0.5428)
R-squared	0.3076	0.1139
N	8506	7977

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. Baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.5 Ingroup Pride

We also planned to explore the hypothesis that for both Turks and Syrians, the effect of outgroup size will be larger among people with higher pride in ingroup. We measured this by asking the respondent: "On a scale of 0 to 10, how proud are you to be [ingroup]?" The mean of this measure was 8.3 for Syrians while it was 9.3 for Turks.

Figure A6: Histograms of Ingroup Pride



Table A13 shows our experimental results interacted with our ingroup pride measure.

Table A13: Pride

	Turks	Syrians
Ingroup Pride	0.5944***	0.3178**
	(0.0586)	(0.1113)
30% Outgroup	-0.0357	-0.3905
	(0.5566)	(0.9232)
40% Outgroup	0.3720	0.0707
	(0.5165)	(0.9489)
50% Outgroup	0.7811	0.6581
	(0.5698)	(0.8326)
60% Outgroup	0.6562	0.7515
	(0.5812)	(0.8072)
70% Outgroup	1.4376*	0.6750
	(0.5672)	(0.8218)
80% Outgroup	1.4114*	0.7412
	(0.5895)	(0.8226)
90% Outgroup	1.5805**	0.3368
	(0.5401)	(0.8078)
Occasional Crime	0.3093	2.2572***
	(0.2759)	(0.2609)
Frequent Crime	1.0342***	3.4859***
	(0.2998)	(0.2839)
Quality Services	0.3192	-0.2664
	(0.2239)	(0.2116)
Highly Social	0.0412	-0.4032*
	(0.2348)	(0.2048)
Many Devout	0.3762	-0.2149
	(0.2287)	(0.2023)
Same Wealth	-0.2998	0.0741
	(0.2400)	(0.2095)
30% Outgroup × Ingroup Pride	-0.0571	-0.0117
	(0.0586)	(0.1220)
40% Outgroup × Ingroup Pride	-0.1916***	-0.0550
	(0.0548)	(0.1220)
50% Outgroup × Ingroup Pride	-0.3194***	-0.1227
	(0.0602)	(0.1102)
60% Outgroup × Ingroup Pride	-0.3906***	-0.1434
	(0.0615)	(0.1074)
70% Outgroup × Ingroup Pride	-0.5400***	-0.1432
	(0.0599)	(0.1080)
80% Outgroup × Ingroup Pride	-0.5918***	-0.1374
	(0.0623)	(0.1078)
90% Outgroup × Ingroup Pride	-0.6331***	-0.0992
	(0.0576)	(0.1060)
Occasional Crime × Ingroup Pride	-0.1093***	-0.4448***
	(0.0300)	(0.0329)
Frequent Crime × Ingroup Pride	-0.2949***	-0.6685***
	(0.0327)	(0.0353)
Quality Services × Ingroup Pride	-0.0253	0.0453+
	(0.0244)	(0.0265)
Highly Social × Ingroup Pride	0.0185	0.0804**
	(0.0253)	(0.0259)
Many Devout × Ingroup Pride	-0.0396	0.0263
	(0.0248)	(0.0256)
Same Wealth × Ingroup Pride	0.0317	-0.0086
	(0.0259)	(0.0264)
R-squared	0.3287	0.1568
N	8503	7970

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. Baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.6 Religiosity

Shared religion may create a cross-cutting cleavage, reducing in-group preferences for those who are most devout. Another exploratory hypothesis proposed that Turk ingroup preferences will be lower for those with higher religiosity scores (Muslim identity creates cross-cutting cleavage) in line with (Lazarev and Sharma, 2017*a*). We asked four questions to get at religiosity.

How often do you pray? (Never to five times a day on a 7 point scale)

To what extent do you think that Turkish state law should be reformed to include more Sharia? 0 to 10 scale where 0 is Not at all, stay the same and 10 is Completely, include more Sharia.

How much do you agree with the following statements: It is better if Muslim women wear a headscarf outside the house? 0 to 10 scale where 10 is complete agreement.

How much do you agree with the following statements: Men and women in Turkey interact too freely, there should be more segregation between them? 0 to 10 scale where 10 is complete agreement.

All of these items mapped very highly onto a single latent factor according to PCA (α<0.74). The index was standardized to range between 0 and 1. The mean for Syrians was 0.68 and for Turks it was 0.25. Table A14 shows our experimental results interacted with our religiosity measure.

Table A14: Religiosity

	Turks	Syrians
Religiosity	-1.9965***	1.5796
	(0.4772)	(1.2877)
30% Outgroup	-0.5786***	0.8116
	(0.1630)	(1.0354)
40% Outgroup	-1.8403***	0.5968
	(0.1663)	(0.9583)
50% Outgroup	-2.3734***	-0.3153
	(0.1737)	(0.9097)
60% Outgroup	-3.6693***	0.4763
	(0.1776)	(0.9166)
70% Outgroup	-4.4380***	-0.0436
	(0.1648)	(0.8871)
80% Outgroup	-4.9358***	0.4042
	(0.1688)	(0.8792)
90% Outgroup	-5.2578***	0.3476
	(0.1679)	(0.8598)
Occasional Crime	-1.0181***	-1.6549***
	(0.1055)	(0.3169)
Frequent Crime	-2.5472***	-1.6166***
	(0.1200)	(0.3213)
Quality Services	0.0383	-0.2578
	(0.0859)	(0.2381)
Highly Social	0.3031***	-0.7567**
	(0.0836)	(0.2436)
Many Devout	-0.0709	-0.1828
	(0.0853)	(0.2310)
Same Wealth	0.0345	0.1504
	(0.0855)	(0.2439)
30% Outgroup × Religiosity	0.0890	-1.8454
	(0.4958)	(1.5481)
40% Outgroup × Religiosity	1.6759***	-1.2832
	(0.4886)	(1.4086)
50% Outgroup × Religiosity	0.5960	-0.0397
	(0.5328)	(1.3358)
60% Outgroup × Religiosity	2.5708***	-1.2595
	(0.5508)	(1.3551)
70% Outgroup × Religiosity	3.4296***	-0.6166
	(0.5277)	(1.3105)
80% Outgroup × Religiosity	3.4330***	-1.0579
	(0.5702)	(1.2902)
90% Outgroup × Religiosity	3.8339***	-1.1077
	(0.5512)	(1.2644)
Occasional Crime × Religiosity	1.2936***	0.2987
	(0.3299)	(0.4532)
Frequent Crime × Religiosity	3.4850***	-0.6780
	(0.3669)	(0.4652)
Quality Services × Religiosity	0.0753	0.5479
	(0.2689)	(0.3412)
Highly Social × Religiosity	-0.4427^{+}	1.4692***
	(0.2636)	(0.3507)
Many Devout × Religiosity	0.3592	0.2833
	(0.2674)	(0.3358)
Same Wealth × Religiosity	0.0243	-0.2250
	(0.2676)	(0.3490)
R-squared	0.3308	0.1141
N	8506	7994

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. Baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.7 Syrians as a Benefit for Turkey

I think this will map onto identity so much that it will not be helpful to run these unless you really want to hit home that Turks who don't believe Syrians are beneficial to the country at all are less likely to want to live next to them. But we can see that at least SD bias for Turks in our study is probably very low. The means for these outcomes is around 6 for Syrians (8 for benefit economy) and around .6 for Turks (yes, 0.6!)

Figure A7: Histograms of Syrians as Benefit for Turkey



A.6.8 Victimization for Syrians

A large body of literature in the field of peace studies finds that past victimization may inhibit societal reintegration. We explore this among Syrians in our sample through asking them a question of having a family member suffer major bodily injury or loss of life during

the civil war.

Table A15: Experienced Victimization in the War Among Syrian Subsample

Victimization Syria	-0.4096
	(0.4617)
30% Outgroup	-0.9431**
	(0.3601)
40% Outgroup	-0.4723
	(0.3146)
50% Outgroup	-0.5684+
	(0.3053)
60% Outgroup	-0.6816*
	(0.3058)
70% Outgroup	-0.6978*
	(0.2926)
80% Outgroup	-0.5148+
	(0.2845)
90% Outgroup	-0.5712*
	(0.2851)
Occasional Crime	-1.2910***
	(0.1029)
Frequent Crime	-1.9319***
	(0.1109)
Quality Services	0.2962***
	(0.0793)
Highly Social	0.3363***
	(0.0788)
Many Devout	-0.0373
	(0.0781)
Same Wealth	-0.0126
	(0.0809)
30% Outgroup × Victimization Syria	0.9426+
	(0.5384)
40% Outgroup × Victimization Syria	0.2848
	(0.5037)
50% Outgroup × Victimization Syria	0.4310
	(0.4755)
60% Outgroup × Victimization Syria	0.5912
	(0.4699)
70% Outgroup × Victimization Syria	0.4620
	(0.4605)
80% Outgroup × Victimization Syria	0.3680
	(0.4522)
90% Outgroup × Victimization Syria	0.3206
	(0.4460)
Occasional Crime × Victimization Syria	-0.2911+
	(0.1491)
Frequent Crime × Victimization Syria	-0.2768+
	(0.1616)
Quality Services × Victimization Syria	-0.3507**
	(0.1169)
Highly Social × Victimization Syria	-0.1877
	(0.1166)
Many Devout × Victimization Syria	0.1046
	(0.1166)
Same Wealth × Victimization Syria	0.0220
	(0.1178)
R-squared	0.1093
N	7937

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. Baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

Much research has shown that among hosts in contexts accepting influxes of immigrants, fears of economic competition may drive unwillingness to integrate with newcomers. We explore this hypothesis by combining questions on agreement with the statement that certain employment sectors should be off limits to Syrians and that Syrians are receiving more assistance from the Turkish government than they deserve. We combined these two measures into a single scale after having confirmed using principal component analysis (PCA) that they constitute a single latent factor of economic concerns ($\alpha > 0.7$). (We left out two other measures gauging the extent to which respondents feel they have personal connections needed to and on whether the law should stipulate that Syrians and Turks be paid wages for the same work that did not meet this threshold.) The index was standardized to range between 0 and 1.

Table A16: Have Economic Concerns Among Turkish Subsample

Econ_Concerns_Index	2.4118***
	(0.4555)
30% Outgroup	-0.3845
	(0.4179)
40% Outgroup	-0.9943*
	(0.4063)
50% Outgroup	-1.0924**
	(0.3959)
60% Outgroup	-1.6863***
	(0.3998)
70% Outgroup	-1.5584***
	(0.4243)
80% Outgroup	-2.1621***
	(0.4239)
90% Outgroup	-2.9727***
	(0.4211)
Occasional Crime	-0.2080
	(0.2442)
Frequent Crime	-0.9875***
	(0.2759)
Quality Services	0.2235
	(0.2081)
Highly Social	0.3842*
	(0.1898)
Many Devout	0.2917
	(0.2022)
Same Wealth	0.1546
	(0.2030)
30% Outgroup × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.1965
	(0.4819)
40% Outgroup × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.5328
	(0.4723)
50% Outgroup × Econ_Concerns_Index	-1.3668**
	(0.4695)
60% Outgroup × Econ_Concerns_Index	-1.6210***
	(0.4786)
70% Outgroup × Econ_Concerns_Index	-2.5104***
	(0.4980)
80% Outgroup × Econ_Concerns_Index	-2.3787***
	(0.5020)
90% Outgroup × Econ_Concerns_Index	-1.6564**
	(0.5050)
Occasional Crime × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.5982*
	(0.2933)
Frequent Crime × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.8626**
	(0.3297)
Quality Services × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.1774
	(0.2495)
Highly Social × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.2098
	(0.2280)
Many Devout × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.3363
	(0.2424)
Same Wealth × Econ_Concerns_Index	-0.2023
	(0.2428)
R-squared	0.3076
N	8506

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. Baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.9 Neighborhood Satisfaction

Respondents who are very satisfied with the neighborhood they live in may respond to the experiment differently than those who are dissatisfied. The distributions of satisfaction with one's neighborhood across Turks and Syrians is presented in Figure A8. As a robustness check we rerun our study dropping out both those who are very (dis)satisfied with their neighborhoods (a score of 0 or 10 on the 0-10 scale). See Table A17 which shows that subsampling to those without extreme (dis)satisfaction regarding their current neighborhood does not substantively affect our findings.

Figure A8: Neighborhood Satisfaction by Country of Birth,



Note:

Table A17: Neighborhood Satisfaction Extremes Excluded

	Turks	Syrians
30% Outgroup	-0.4411***	-0.5458^{+}
	(0.1139)	(0.2853)
40% Outgroup	-1.3997***	-0.3481
	(0.1124)	(0.2606)
50% Outgroup	-2.1394***	-0.3518
	(0.1199)	(0.2471)
60% Outgroup	-2.8832***	-0.3833
	(0.1232)	(0.2440)
70% Outgroup	-3.5126***	-0.4448^{+}
	(0.1181)	(0.2380)
80% Outgroup	-3.9346***	-0.3301
	(0.1255)	(0.2324)
90% Outgroup	-4.1253***	-0.4058^{+}
	(0.1244)	(0.2298)
Occasional Crime	-0.7186***	-1.5384***
	(0.0730)	(0.0792)
Frequent Crime	-1.7185***	-2.1667***
	(0.0818)	(0.0861)
Same Wealth	-0.0098	0.0109
	(0.0600)	(0.0628)
Quality Services	0.0500	0.1254*
	(0.0604)	(0.0622)
Many Devout	-0.0009	0.0187
	(0.0602)	(0.0625)
Highly Social	0.1461*	0.2770***
	(0.0585)	(0.0623)
R-squared	0.2886	0.1115
N	7363	6921

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood to move to neighborhood, dropping out scores of 0 or 10 on the 0-10 scale. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the full model, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.10 Trust in Outgroup

Figure A9 shows how skewed trust in outgroups is across our subsamples of Turks and Syrians. Turks do not trust Syrians at all, with over 90% responding this way. They do, however, trust their ingroup members to a quite high extent with the average response here being 3.37 on a scale ranging from 1 to 4. Syrians, on the other hand, trust Turks at a mean of 2.76 and trust their own at a mean of 3.37. However, Figure A9 shows that outgroup trust does not predict our findings well among Turks. For Syrians, trust of Turks seems to make them more open to living with higher proportions of the outgroup.

Figure A9: Trust in Ingroup and Outgroup, by Country of Birth,



Note:

Table A18: Trust in Outgroup, by Country of Birth

	Turks	Syrians
Trust Outgroup	0.4378	-0.3440
	(0.3085)	(0.2842)
30% Outgroup	0.1519	-2.1763*
	(0.3689)	(0.9387)
40% Outgroup	-0.9007**	-1.5519+
	(0.3373)	(0.8586)
50% Outgroup	-1.6313***	-1.4469+
	(0.3757)	(0.8210)
60% Outgroup	-2.9786***	-2.2437**
	(0.3874)	(0.7707)
70% Outgroup	-3.5682***	-2.0117**
	(0.4005)	(0.7744)
80% Outgroup	-4.2581***	-2.0064**
	(0.3893)	(0.7491)
90% Outgroup	-4.0874***	-2.2497**
	(0.3653)	(0.7502)
Occasional Crime	-0.2380	-0.2788
	(0.2130)	(0.2613)
Frequent Crime	-0.9553***	-0.4274
	(0.2652)	(0.2819)
Quality Services	0.1742	-0.2532
	(0.1887)	(0.2089)
Highly Social	-0.0909	-0.1630
	(0.1888)	(0.2054)
Many Devout	-0.0347	-0.2628
	(0.1918)	(0.2026)
Same Wealth	-0.2827	0.1885
	(0.1746)	(0.2196)
30% Outgroup × Trust Outgroup	-0.6474+	0.6115+
	(0.3324)	(0.3279)
40% Outgroup × Trust Outgroup	-0.4965+	0.4285
	(0.2996)	(0.3029)
50% Outgroup × Trust Outgroup	-0.5341	0.3863
	(0.3399)	(0.2900)
60% Outgroup × Trust Outgroup	-0.0310	0.6504*
	(0.3485)	(0.2767)
70% Outgroup × Trust Outgroup	-0.0355	0.5364*
	(0.3631)	(0.2714)
80% Outgroup × Trust Outgroup	0.1302	0.5832*
	(0.3470)	(0.2647)
90% Outgroup × Trust Outgroup	-0.2229	0.6417*
	(0.3198)	(0.2638)
Occasional Crime × Trust Outgroup	-0.4352*	-0.4285***
	(0.1869)	(0.0922)
Frequent Crime × Trust Outgroup	-0.6764**	-0.6031***
	(0.2384)	(0.0998)
Quality Services × Trust Outgroup	-0.0900	0.1299+
	(0.1697)	(0.0735)
Highly Social × Trust Outgroup	0.2729	0.1477*
	(0.1693)	(0.0728)
Many Devout × Trust Outgroup	0.0388	0.0954
	(0.1726)	(0.0721)
Same Wealth × Trust Outgroup	0.2661+	-0.0743
	(0.1537)	(0.0770)
R-squared	0.3050	0.1105
N	8467	7826

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood to move to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the full model, baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social. For Turks and Syrian models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.6.11 Contact with Outgroup

Figure A10 shows how skewed contact with outgroups is across our subsamples of Turks and Syrians. Turks almost never speak to Syrians, while they speak to other Turks all the time. About 1 in 5 Syrians never speaks to Turks but also less than 30% of our sample speaks to Syrians all the time. However, Table A19 shows that outgroup contact does not seem to determine neighborhood demographic preferences.

Figure A10: Contact with Ingroup and Outgroup, by Country of Birth,



Note:

Table A19: Contact with Outgroup, by Country of Birth

	Turks	Syrians
Contact_Outgroup	-0.4764***	-0.0698
	(0.0806)	(0.1174)
30% Outgroup	-0.5469***	-0.6148
	(0.1074)	(0.4263)
40% Outgroup	-1.4750***	-0.4285
	(0.1076)	(0.3846)
50% Outgroup	-2.2664***	-0.4748
	(0.1132)	(0.3718)
60% Outgroup	-3.1774***	-0.5196
	(0.1170)	(0.3754)
70% Outgroup	-3.7865***	-0.6746+
	(0.1127)	(0.3633)
80% Outgroup	-4.3279***	-0.5907+
	(0.1188)	(0.3521)
90% Outgroup	-4.5414***	-0.6158+
	(0.1202)	(0.3484)
Occasional Crime	-0.7507***	-1.6130***
	(0.0709)	(0.1188)
Frequent Crime	-1.7836***	-2.5351***
	(0.0795)	(0.1268)
Quality Services	0.1021+	0.2546**
	(0.0587)	(0.0932)
Highly Social	0.2103***	0.4073***
	(0.0570)	(0.0940)
Many Devout	-0.0079	0.1941*
	(0.0584)	(0.0939)
Same Wealth	-0.0087	-0.1149
	(0.0586)	(0.0929)
30% Outgroup × Contact_Outgroup	0.0359	0.0629
	(0.0814)	(0.1344)
40% Outgroup × Contact_Outgroup	0.1592*	0.0344
	(0.0750)	(0.1231)
50% Outgroup × Contact_Outgroup	0.1995*	0.0437
	(0.0854)	(0.1179)
60% Outgroup × Contact_Outgroup	0.4678***	0.0427
	(0.0765)	(0.1183)
70% Outgroup × Contact_Outgroup	0.5608***	0.0800
	(0.0860)	(0.1159)
80% Outgroup × Contact_Outgroup	0.6223***	0.0998
	(0.0845)	(0.1137)
90% Outgroup × Contact_Outgroup	0.6022***	0.0777
	(0.0879)	(0.1128)
Occasional Crime × Contact_Outgroup	0.1656***	0.0641+
	(0.0474)	(0.0373)
Frequent Crime × Contact_Outgroup	0.2438***	0.1751***
	(0.0546)	(0.0374)
Quality Services × Contact_Outgroup	-0.0691+	-0.0550+
	(0.0400)	(0.0284)
Highly Social × Contact_Outgroup	-0.0113	-0.0614*
	(0.0354)	(0.0285)
Many Devout × Contact_Outgroup	0.0554	-0.0707*
	(0.0369)	(0.0277)
Same Wealth × Contact_Outgroup	0.0224	0.0409
	(0.0356)	(0.0283)
R-squared	0.3128	0.1074
N	8509	7991

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood to move to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. For the models, baselines are no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.

A.7 A Second Experimental Robustness Check

We also assess reactions to different types of neighbors at the individual level through an outcome question measured in the second experiment. The second experiment manipulates ascriptive identity markers as well as behavioral ones of a hypothetical individual and then asks whether the participant would like to have the described individual as a neighbor.

Hypothesis 1. We anticipate that ascriptive markers (birth of father and mother) will trump efforts to integrate (language, marriage, rule following behaviors) in evaluations of neighbors. The AMCEs for ascriptive markers will be greater than those for integration efforts.

Figure A11: AMCEs on Likelihood of Accepting as Neighbor



Note: OLS regression on full sample, n=16,517. Point estimates are depicted as circles and Xs with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from robust standard errors clustered by respondent.

Figure A11 shows that ascriptive markers indeed trump efforts to integrate in evaluations of neighbors. This is particularly true for origins of one's father, suggesting a gendered

understanding of belonging in Turkey.

Hypothesis 2. We anticipate that Turks will exhibit stronger reactions to ascriptive markers (birthplace of father and mother) than Syrians. A heterogeneous effects analysis of our AMCEs conditioned on respondent country of birth will find stronger effects of ascriptive markers for Turks than Syrians.

Figure A12: AMCEs (top) and Marginal Means of Father (bottom left) and Mother (bottom right) Origins on Likelihood of Accepting as Neighbor Among Turks versus Syrians ,



Note: OLS regression on full sample, n=16,542. Point estimates are depicted as circles, Xs, squares, and diamonds with 95% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) from standard errors clustered by respondent.

Figure A12 depicts subsampled results and marginal means of the effect of ascriptive

markers on the probability that a profile will be accepted as a neighbor. It is striking how much more Turks place emphasis on a profile's parentage compared to Syrians. The marginal means also demonstrate Syrian's higher baseline willingness to accept someone as a neighbor. We cannot explain why this is the case however. Syrians may be more open to neighbors of differing backgrounds because they themselves have moved around often and have gotten to know neighbors from many different backgrounds in addition to Turks (in line with contact theory) or they may be more accepting of the dominant host population out of gratitude for being allowed to stay in Turkey. There are many other potential explanations for this openness to outgroups among Syrian refugees that we are unable to interrogate fully here. However, this experiment is being employed here to provide robustness for our findings in experiment 1 and we demonstrate here that it does so.

A.8 Alternative Identity Measures

Recognizing that in- versus out- group groupings are socially constructed and seeking to avoid reification of birthplace as the only source of identity, in robustness checks we planned to employ PCA to create some alternative measures of host versus migrant groupings. As the nature of these groupings are fluid, our secondary formulations of host versus migrant grouping measure(s) were data-driven. We considered a few different groupings of questions to examine host-migrant differences. Analyses employing secondary measures of identity groupings are exploratory in nature.

First, some may consider these groupings to be based on bloodlines. Thus, we created a measure of Turkishness based on where the respondent's mother, father, and grandparents were born, with higher scores capturing more family members being born in the host community. We only had 270 individual in our sample with any sort of outgroup heritage across all of these family members and most were Syrians. We did determine this to be a large enough sample to run our study on due to loss of power.

Second, we consider components of the Stanford's Immigration Policy Lab multidimensional Integration Index examining linguistic, political, economic, and psychological integration along with other measures of integration including years living in Turkey and citizenship status. These measures may contribute to making a person "feel" Turkish. Histogram A13 showing our Economic Integration measures demonstrate that Turks and Syrians differ greatly when it comes to satisfaction with their current employment situation, but that their employment situations are perhaps not as far off from one another as one might think. Both groups have a high proportion of respondents stating that they are unemployed and not looking for work. Syrians dominate the category of those who are unemployed and looking for work currently. Just about 40% of Turkish sample and 35% of our Syrian sample report having paid work even if temporarily only.

Which of these descriptions best applies to what you have been doing for the last four

weeks? Please select only one. o In paid work (even if away temporarily) ([Do not read unless needed]: employee, self-employed, working for your family business, free-lance) (1) o Student (even if on vacation) (2) o Unemployed and actively looking for a job (3) o Unemployed and not actively looking for a job ([Do not read unless needed]: e.g., Doing unpaid housework, looking after children or other persons, permanently sick or disabled or retired) (4)

As one might expect, psychological and linguistic integration are much higher for Turks than for Syrians across a variety of measures. For Navigational Integration, both Turks and Syrians do not think it is easy to find a job. This is the only measure where Turks report being less integrated than Syrians do. Seeing a doctor at a public hospital is somewhat easier for Turks, but not to a great extent. However, opening a bank account is clearly quite easy for Turks, and much more difficult for Syrians. Finally, Turks feel that they understand politics and they discuss them much more often than Syrians do. This may not be surprising given that knowledge and discussion of politics in Syria was sensitive.

Figure A13: Histograms of Economic Integration by Country of Birth



Figure A14: Histograms of Psychological Integration by Country of Birth



How Connected Do you Feel to Turkey



How Often do You Feel Like an Outsider in Turkey



Want to Move to Another Country

Figure A15: Histograms of Linguistic Integration by Country of Birth



Figure A16: Histogram of Navigational Integration by Country of Birth



Figure A17: Histogram of Political Integration by Country of Birth



A.8.1 Feel Turkish

Feelings of belonging may matter or some Syrians may actually have adopted a Turkish identity. Only 124 of our sample have Turkish citizenship however. We asked our respondents how much they feel they are Turkish on a scale from 0 to 10. The mean for Syrians was 3.87 and for Turks it was 9.28. Table A20 shows our experimental results interacted with our religiosity measure.

Table A20: Feel Turkish

	Full_Sample	Turks	Syrians
Feel Turkish	0.4202***	0.5502***	-0.0849
	(0.0373)	(0.0516)	(0.0831)
30% Outgroup	-0.4058	-0.0975	-0.3523
	(0.3545)	(0.5052)	(0.4933)
40% Outgroup	0.0172	-0.0341	-0.1052
	(0.3323)	(0.4587)	(0.4690)
50% Outgroup	0.4212	0.7074	0.0471
	(0.3229)	(0.4982)	(0.4503)
60% Outgroup	0.4786	0.3845	-0.2793
	(0.3201)	(0.5492)	(0.4449)
70% Outgroup	0.5415+	1.1222*	-0.4388
	(0.3107)	(0.4832)	(0.4357)
80% Outgroup	0.8460**	0.9769+	-0.2804
	(0.3036)	(0.5228)	(0.4266)
90% Outgroup	0.7489*	1.0997*	-0.4149
	(0.3018)	(0.4771)	(0.4223)
Occasional Crime	-1.9963***	0.2945	-2.4544***
	(0.1157)	(0.2603)	(0.1348)
Frequent Crime	-2.7503***	0.9635***	-3.7635***
	(0.1256)	(0.2899)	(0.1455)
Quality Services	0.2082*	0.3720+	0.2494*
	(0.0900)	(0.2129)	(0.1072)
Highly Social	0.3047***	0.0500	0.3476**
	(0.0916)	(0.2130)	(0.1096)
Many Devout	0.0873	0.2369	0.0703
	(0.0896)	(0.2161)	(0.1063)
Same Wealth	-0.1058	-0.2288	-0.1304
	(0.0906)	(0.2241)	(0.1074)
Turkey	-0.8923***		
	(0.1471)		
30% Outgroup × Feel Turkish	-0.0255	-0.0501	-0.0516
	(0.0388)	(0.0534)	(0.0954)
40% Outgroup × Feel Turkish	-0.1658***	-0.1501**	-0.0787
	(0.0369)	(0.0491)	(0.0895)
50% Outgroup × Feel Turkish	-0.2957***	-0.3128***	-0.1282
	(0.0363)	(0.0532)	(0.0855)
60% Outgroup × Feel Turkish	-0.3718***	-0.3625***	-0.0580
	(0.0361)	(0.0585)	(0.0843)
70% Outgroup × Feel Turkish	-0.4338***	-0.5085***	-0.0315
	(0.0349)	(0.0516)	(0.0831)
80% Outgroup × Feel Turkish	-0.5012***	-0.5478***	-0.0376
	(0.0343)	(0.0555)	(0.0815)
90% Outgroup × Feel Turkish	-0.5021***	-0.5838***	-0.0266
	(0.0343)	(0.0514)	(0.0806)
Occasional Crime × Feel Turkish	0.1400***	-0.1077***	0.2616***
	(0.0148)	(0.0283)	(0.0254)
Frequent Crime × Feel Turkish	0.1297***	-0.2879***	0.4321***
	(0.0164)	(0.0317)	(0.0278)
Quality Services × Feel Turkish	-0.0190	-0.0311	-0.0381+
	(0.0118)	(0.0232)	(0.0208)
Highly Social × Feel Turkish	-0.0098	0.0180	-0.0224
	(0.0118)	(0.0231)	(0.0210)
Many Devout × Feel Turkish	-0.0130	-0.0261	-0.0105
	(0.0117)	(0.0235)	(0.0207)
Same Wealth × Feel Turkish	0.0139	0.0250	0.0302
	(0.0118)	(0.0243)	(0.0207)
Turkey × Feel Turkish	-0.1130***		
	(0.0198)		
R-squared	0.2266	0.3289	0.1451
N	16488	8494	7994

Note: + 0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. OLS regression employed on outcome of likelihood of moving to neighborhood. Table reports point estimates with robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses below. Baselines are born in Syria, no crime, lower wealth, poor services, few devout, and not social.